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CHAPTER 11 
State and Local Taxation 
EDWARD F. HINES, JR.* 
§11.1. Introduction. There were an unusually large number of 
developments in the state and local tax area during the Survey year. 
There were twenty-three decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
eleven reported decisions of the Appellate Tax Board, three decisions 
of the Appeals Court and, finally, a decision of the First Circuit. In 
addition, there were a number of important administrative rulings 
and releases. Only on the legislative front was the Survey year a sparse 
one. Although a number of tax bills did pass during the Survey year, 
most of the important pending tax legislation was still bottled up in 
committee as the Survey year drew to a close. 1 
A. REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES 
§11.2. Equalized Valuations. Section 9 of chapter 58 of the Gen-
eral Laws provides that on or before April first of each even num-
bered year, the State Tax Commission (the "Commission") must "de-
termine and establish for each city and town a proposed equalized 
valuation which shall be the fair cash value of all property in such city 
or town subject to local taxation as of January first in such year." The 
equalized valuations so established are the basis for apportioning 
school aid, and highway and lottery funds among the 351 cities and 
towns of the Commonwealth 1 and also the basis for apportioning 
county and other taxes. 2 
Cities or towns dissatisfied with the equalized valuations determined 
*EDWARD F. HINES, JR. is an associate in the law firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston. 
§11.1. 1 In addition to the Governor's substantive tax proposals, H. 6450 (1975), 
there were a number of other important tax bills pending in the Legislature when the 
SURVEY year drew to a close; among them are: (1) H. 6429 (1975), a bill designed to repeal the 
existing inheritance tax system and replace it with a state estate tax patterned after the 
federal estate tax, and (2) H. 339 ( 1975), a State Tax Commission proposal that would repeal 
the administrative provisions of all existing state tax chapters (primarily G.L. cc. 60A-65 and 
enact in their place a new chapter (proposed c. 62A) containing uniform provisions for the 
administration of all state taxes. 
§11.2. 1 See Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2405, 2409, 321 N.E.2d 641, 644. 
2 G.L. c. 58, § I OC. 
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by the Commission may appeal to the Appellate Tax Board on or be-
fore June first of the year the valuations are proposed.3 Such appeals 
must be decided by the Appellate Tax Board no later than the follow-
ing December first; if the Board fails to act on an appeal within that 
time, the appeal is deemed denied.4 The Commission must then pre-
pare and submit to the Legislature no later than the following De-
cember thirty-first a final equalization and apportionment report 
based on "the equalized valuations determined under sections nine 
and ten A, as modified by the appellate tax board under section ten 
B."s 
On April 5, 1974, pursuant to section 9 of chapter 58 of the Gen-
eral Laws, the Commission announced its proposed equalized valua-
tions for the 351 cities and towns for 1974. With respect to the City of 
Boston, the Commission proposed to determine that the fair cash 
value of all the property in the City subject to local taxation as of 
January 1, 1974 was $4,630,400,000. The City, claiming that the value 
of the property did not exceed $1,784,200,000, its aggregate assessed 
value, appealed to the Appellate Tax Board under section lOB of 
chapter 58 of the General Laws. After a hearing at which both sides 
introduced evidence, the Appellate Tax Board, in City of Boston v. 
State Tax Commission, 6 found that the fair cash value of the City's 
property on January 1, 1974 was $2,600,000,000. 7 
At the hearing, witnesses for the City testified that Boston valued all 
of its commercial and industrial real estate and most of its residential 
real estate using the capitalization of income approach. The City's 
witnesses testified that the comparable sales approach was not used to 
any appreciable extent. 8 
The Commission's proposed valuation was based largely on two 
sources. The first was a prospectus, prepared by the City in connec-
tion with a bond issue, which represented that the value of the prop-
erty in the City was $5,000,000,000. 9 The second was a study of the 
ratio of assessed value to sales price in the case of about 6000 sales oc-
curring in the City during the years 1972 to 1973. On the basis of this 
study, the Commission concluded that residential property in the City 
was assessed on the average at 24 percent, that commercial property in 
3 !d. § lOB. 
4 !d. The statute provides that "the decision of the board shall be final." 
5 /d. § lOC. 
6 No. 73037 (App. Tax Bd. Jan. 31, 1975). 
7 !d. at 27. 
8 !d. at 6-7. 
• Counsel for the underwriters of the bonds would probably be interested in the tes-
timony of the Collector/Treasurer of the City with regard to this representation. Ac-
cording to the Board, he testified that "he agreed with that value only insofar as it was 
related to the bond issue; it was, he said, a case of the City putting its best possible foot 
forward." City of Boston v. State Tax Comm'n, No. 73037, at 8 (App. Tax Bd. Jan. 31, 
1975). 
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the City was assessed on the average at 35 percent, and that industrial 
property in the City was assessed on the average at 50 percent. 10 
The Board found the Commission's evidence unpersuasive. It dis-
missed the valuation contained in the prospectus as based on studies 
"not intended ... for the purpose of estimating the 'market value' of 
the City's properties."11 Moreover, it discounted the value of the 
sales/assessment study because it concluded that the sales included in 
the study were not adequately screened to insure that they reflected 
only arms' -length prices. 12 In addition, the Board said that insufficient 
commercial and industrial sales were included in the study. The 
Board stated that, where the number of commerical and industrial 
sales are low, but the percentage of such property in the City is high, 
other valuation techniques, including the capitalization of income ap-
proach, should be used in appraising commercial and industrial prop-
erty. 
The decision of the Board in the Boston case was greeted with out-
rage by many of the other cities and towns, 13 and the Commission was 
urged to appeal. When it declined, several of the other cities and 
towns filed a complaint in the single justice session of the Supreme 
Judicial Court seeking to have the Commission recompute, in light of 
the Board's decision in the Boston case,14 the equalized valuations of 
those cities and towns that had not appealed their proposed valuations 
to the Board. In City of Malden v. Appellate Tax Board, 15 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that, under the equalization statutes, the Commis-
sion had neither the duty nor the power to revise the equalized valua-
10 ld. at 20. The Commission's valuation was based on these ratios and information as 
to the total property included in each category (residential-32 percent; commercial 
-56 percent; industrial-12 percent). 
11 I d. at 23. Although the Board devoted most of its lengthy (39 pages) report to a 
detailed, and at times rather ad hominem, criticism of the evidence introduced by the 
Commission, it offered no explanation for its own $2,600,000,000 figure. The Board 
did suggest, id. at 7, that the City gave too little weight to the comparable sales ap-
proach in arriving at the assessed value of its real estate. This may account for the in-
crease over the figure proposed by the City. 
12 Annexation E of the Board's opinion contains a list of twenty-four factors that the 
Board indicated should be taken into consideration in screening sales for a 
sales/assessment study. 
13 Among other things, the decision led to the introduction of a bill, S. 1446 (1975), 
to abolish the Appellate Tax Board. The bill, introduced and supported by the Senate 
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation, was anything but frivolous and the 
hearing on the bill on March 4, 1975 was lively and well-attended. No action had been 
taken on the bill by the close of the SuRVEY year. 
14 The sales/assessment study approach used by the Commission in determining 
Boston's proposed equalized valuation presumably was also used in developing the 
proposed valuations of other cities and towns. Presumbly, no more screening of sales 
was done in the other cases than was done in the Boston case. Accordingly, there was 
much to be said for the argument that the nonappealing cities and towns would prob-
ably have had their valuations reduced by the Board had they appealed. 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1020, 326 N.E.2d 342. 
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tions of other municipalities in light of the Board's decision in the 
Boston case. 16 The Court read section 1 OC of chapter 58 of the Gen-
eral Laws as requiring the Commission to prepare its final equaliza-
tion and apportionment using the equalized valuations originally 
proposed, except to the extent modified by the Board in an appeal 
under section 1 OB. 17 With some logic, the Court observed that intro-
duction of a discretionary element at this stage would make nonsense 
of the statutory timetable, particularly the December 31 deadline for 
submitting a final report to the Legislature. 18 
In light of the Court's decision in the Malden case, its decision in 
City of Fall River v. State Tax Commission 19 is particularly interesting. 
This case was an appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board 
allowing a plea in bar of the Commission. The City had filed an ap-
peal with the Board under section 1 OB of chapter 58 of the General 
Laws, challenging the equalized valuation proposed for it by the 
Commission. 20 The Commission filed its answer and then, two weeks 
later, filed a plea in bar. The City took the position that the plea was 
not properly before the Board, arguing that under the rules of the 
Board a motion for leave to file the plea was necessary since the 
Commission had already filed its answer. 21 The Court affirmed the 
Board's decision, holding that no such formality was necessary where 
the claim was lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 22 
The interesting aspect of the Fall River case is that the Court did 
review the Board's decision, even though section lOB of chapter 58 of 
the General Laws provides that decisions of the Board in equalized 
valuation appeals are "final." There is some authority for the proposi-
tion that the term "final" in this context does not preclude review of 
the Board's decision by the Supreme Judicial Court. 23 However, as the 
Court itself observed in the Malden case, 24 if the Board's decision in 
16 /d. at 1026, 326 N.E.2d at 345. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
the equalization statutes do not violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and 
equal protection. /d. at 1027-30, 326 N.E.2d at 345-46. 
17 Id. at 1026, 326 N.E.2d at 345. 
18 /d. 
19 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1452, 326 N.E.2d 903. 
20 !d., 326 N.E.2d at 904. 
21 !d. at 1453, 326 N.E.2d at 904. 
22 /d. at 1454, 326 N.E.2d at 904. In addition, the Court held that Rule 37 of the 
Board, which reserves the right to waive formalities, permitted the Board to overrule 
the objection to the belated plea in bar. !d. at 1454-55, 326 N.E.2d at 904-05. As to 
pleas in bar before the Appellate Tax Board, see Assessors of New Braintree v. Pioneer 
Valley Academy, Inc., 355 Mass. 610, 618-19, 246 N.E.2d 792, 797 (1969); Singer Sew-
ing Machine Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 341 Mass. 513, 515, 170 N.E.2d 687, 688 
(1960). 
23 Compare Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Chilton Club, 318 Mass. 285, 287, 
61 N.E.2d 335, 337 (1945), with Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of 
Corps. & Taxation, 273 Mass. 212, 215, 174 N.E. 116, 117 (1930) and Commissioner of 
Ins. v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 564, 564-65, 294 N.E.2d 352, 353. 
24 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1026, 326 N.E.2d at 345. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/15
206 1975 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §11.2 
equalization appeals is not final in an absolute sense, it is difficult to 
see how the Commission can be expected to meet the December 31 
deadline for submitting its final report to the Legislature. 25 
Another Survey year case, Town of Brookline v. County Commissioners, 26 
involved a bill for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality 
of the manner in which Norfolk County taxes were apportioned and 
assessed for the eighteen-month fiscal year ending June 30, 1974. The 
County Commissioners had assessed and apportioned taxes among 
the various cities and towns of the county for this period based on the 
valuations established in section 1 of chapter 660 of the Acts of 1963. 
Since section 1 of chapter 660 reflected the latest state valuation, and 
since section 31 of chapter 35 of the General Laws, as then in effect, 
required apportionment in accord with the "latest state valuation," the 
Commissioners concededly acted in accordance with the governing 
statute. The plaintiffs argued, however, that apportionment based on 
the values established by section 1 of chapter 660 of the Acts of 1963 
violated the rule of proportional taxation established in article IV of 
section I of chapter I of part II of the Massachusetts Constitution. 27 
The Court stated that the strict rule of proportionality, applicable in 
the cas~ of individual taxpayers, does not apply to decisions of the 
Legislature in allocating public burdens among the cities and towns. 28 
Nonetheless, the Court reached the result urged by the plaintiffs on a 
different basis. The Court noted that the final paragraph of the con-
stitutional provision29 requires a revaluation of all property in the 
Cdmmonwealth at least every ten years. Accordingly, the Court held: 
"In light of this constitutional imperative, it is evident that a distribu-
tion of county taxes based on valuations more than ten years out of 
date, when the distribution is based on valuation alone, is unconstitu-
tional .... "30 
Section 31 of chapter 35 of the General Laws was amended by sec-
tion 4 of chapter 492 of the Acts of 1974, effective for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1975, to require apportionment of county taxes in 
25 It will be interesting to observe how the cities and towns respond when the 
equalized valuations for 1976 are proposed. In the light of the 1974 experience, it may 
be assumed that most communities will appeal their proposed valuations to the Board. 
If the Fall River case does mean that decisions of the Board in equalization cases are 
appealable, some cities and towns will undoubtedly exercise that right. The statutory 
timetable, and in particular the December 31 deadline for filing a final report with the 
Legislature, will then be put to the test. 
26 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 946, 327 N.E.2d 690. 
27 MASS. CONST. pt. II, c. I,§ I, art. II. 
28 Id. at 953, 327 N.E.2d at 694, citing Thomson v. City of Chelsea, 358 Mass. 1, 260 
N.E.2d 699 (1970) .. In the Chelsea case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a 1909 
statute exempting Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop from liability for county taxes was 
constitutional as a reasonable compensation for Boston's exclusive control of county af-
fairs. 358 Mass. at 6-9, 260 N.E.2d at 702-04. 
29 MASS. CONST. pt. II, c. I, § I, art. II. 
30 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 957, 327 N.E.2d at 695. 
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accord with the most recent equalization report of the State Tax 
Commission under section 10C of chapter 58 of the General Laws. 
The plaintiffs urged that the County Commissioner be directed to 
use the most recent equalization report in lieu of the valuations estab-
lished by section I of chapter 660 of the Acts of 1963. The Court 
held, however, that it was without power to impose such a require-
ment and left the remedy to be worked out by the parties.31 
§ 11.3. Disproportionate Assessments. Certainly the most publi-
cized development in the local tax area during the Suroey year was the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Toum of Sudbury v. Commissioner of 
Corporations & Taxation. 1 The case arose when the Town of Sudbury 
sought a declaratory judgment2 as to the role of the Commissioner of 
Corporations & Taxation (the "Commissioner") and the State Tax 
Commission (the "Commission") in enforcing the duty of local asses-
sors to assess property at its full fair cash value. Since the decision was 
analyzed at some length in the 1974 Suroey, 3 only the highlights will 
be repeated here. 
Initially, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the Commissioner's 
powers over local assessors were not merely advisory or educational, 
but included powers of direction. Thus, the Court stated that section 
I of chapter 58 of the General Laws grants the Commissioner power 
to "require" the assessors to take any action necessary "to produce uni-
formity throughout the commonwealth in valuation . and 
assessments."4 Moreover, the same section provides that the Commis-
sioner "may cause an assessor to be prosecuted ... for any violation of 
law relative to assessment of taxes for which a penalty is imposed."5 
Furthermore, section 4 of chapter 58 permits the Commissioner to 
"direct" the assessors to adopt certain methods of recordkeeping and 
of information-gathering, 6 and. sections 6 and 7 of chapter 58 allows 
the Commissioner to "require" certain reports and information from 
the assessors. 7 Finally, section 27 of chapter 4I of the General Laws 
allows the Commissioner to remove and replace the assessors if they 
fail to perform their duties. 8 In light of these statutory provisions, the 
Court held that it was "incumbent" on the Commissioner to direct the 
31 !d. at 959, 327 N.E.2d at 696. 
§ 11.3. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2405, $21 N .E.2d 641. 
2 Injunctive relief was also sought, but declined as inappropriate in light of the ex-
pressed willingness of both the State Tax Commission and the Commissioner of Corpo-
rations and Taxation to carry out whatever duties were defined for them by the Court. 
/d. at 2422-23, 321 N.E.2d at 648. 
3 Glazer & Bruskin, State and Local Taxation, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW § 15.9, at 
331-35. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2414, 321 N.E.2d at 646, quoting G.L. c. 58,§ l. 
5 !d. at 2415, 321 N.E.2d at 646, quoting G.L. c. 58, § l. 
6 !d. 
7 /d. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2415-16,321 N.E.2d at 646-47. 
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assessors to comply with their statutory and constitutional obligations 
regarding 100 percent valuation. 9 
Turning to the Commission, the Court held that it too was under 
an obligation to require 100 percent valuation from the local assessors 
in connection with its equalized valuation functions. 10 Section 10 of 
chapter 58 of the General Laws provides that in connection with pre-
paring the equalized valuations, the Commission may "require" from 
state, city and town officers such returns and statements relative to 
the amount and value of taxable property in the several cities and 
towns "as it deems necessary."11 If a city or town fails to furnish the 
information requested by the Commission, it loses its right of appeal 
to the Appellate Tax Board in the event it is dissatisfied with the 
equalized vah,1ation proposed.12 The Court suggested that, if the 
Commission deemed "necessary" accurate. statements of fair cash 
value, it would have the power under these provisions to "require" 
such statements from local officials. 13 Moreover, the· Court added 
that, to the extent such statements were necessary in order to prepare 
equalized valuations, it was the duty of the Commission to require 
them.14 
The Supreme Judicial Court has consistently held, since its land-
mark 1961 decision, Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield,t 5 that local as-
sessors must tax property at its full and fair cash value.16 The Sudbury 
case provides for the first time an enforcement mechanism to imple-
ment the Court's holding. Although the effects of the Sudbury case are 
not yet clear, and may not be for several years to come, the decision 
finally offers at least some hope of a solution to what is certainly one 
of the most vexing problems faced by practitioners in the local tax 
field: the problem of proving disproportionate assessment on an indi-
vidual taxpayer basis. In many cases, the cost of establishing dispro-
portionate assessment on an individual basis is far out of proportion 
9 Id. at 2417, 321 N.E.2d at 647. 
10 Id. at 2420-21, 321 N.E.2d at 648. G.L. c. 58,§ 9, provides that on or before April 
I of each even-numbered year, the Commission must determine for each city or town a 
proposed eq'Qalized valuation which represents the fair cash value of all the taxable 
property of the city or town as Of the preceding January first. Equalized valuations so 
established are used as the basis for apportioning school aid and highway and lottery 
funds and also as the basis for apportioning county and other taxes. See § 11.2 supra. 
11 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2417-18, 321 N.E.2d at 647, quoting G.L. c. 58,§ 10. 
12 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2418, 321 N.E.2d at 647, citing G.L. c. 58,§ 10. 
13 /d. at 2420-21, 321 N.E.2d at 648. 
14 Id. at 2421, 321 N.E.2d at 648. The plaintiffs bill in equity was originally filed in 
the county court. A single justice referred the case to a master, and later confirmed the 
master's report and reported the case to the full court without decision. The master's 
findings showed that fractional valuation made the equalization task "much more dif-
ficult, if not impossible." Id. at 2419, 321 N.E.2d at 647. 
15 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961). 
18 E.g., Assessors of Amherst v. State Tax Comm'n, 357 Mass. 505, 509-10, 258 
N.E.2d 539, 542 (1970). 
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to the amount at stake. Under these circumstances, unless it is possible 
to enter into a stipulation with the assessors concerning the assessment 
percentage actually used in the community, 17 the taxpayer is without 
any practical remedy. Moreover, even where the amount at stake is 
sufficiently large to justify the effort, there is considerable uncertainty 
as to the quantum of proof necessary to establish disproportionate as-
sessment. 
In 1965, the Supreme Judicial Court in Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Asses-
sors of Framingham 18 held that disproportionate assessment issues were 
properly raised in abatement proceedings. 19 However, Shoppers' World 
offered little guidance as to the type or amount of proof necessary to 
establish disproportionate assessment. 20 It was not until 1971, in First 
National Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 21 that the Supreme Judicial 
Court explained what, in its view, would constitute adequate proof of 
dis proportionate assessment. 
In First National Stores, the taxpayer contended that in 1964, 1965, 
and 1966 its property was assessed at from 7 5 to 125 percent of fair 
cash value while most of the rest of the real estate in the city was as-
sessed at below 50 percent of fair cash value. 22 To support this con-
tention, the taxpayer introduced evidence of the sales price of most of 
the real estate sold in Somerville during the years 1960 through 1966. 
A certified copy of each deed of Somerville real estate recorded in 
those years was introduced. The number of sales involved for the 
years 1960 through 1962 was 1016 and the number of sales involved 
for the years 1963 through 1965 was 852.23 
In addition to certified copies of the deeds, the taxpayer introduced 
a tabulation of the sales, giving for each sale, deed, and parcel the fol-
lowing information: (a) the month and year of sale; (b) the street loca-
tion; (c) the record book and p~ge; (d) the value of affixed revenue 
stamps; (e) the sales price thereby indicated; (f) the assessment as of 
the January 1 next following; (g) later change, if any, in the assess-
ment; and (h) the ratio of assessed value to sales price.24 Based on 
these tabulations, the taxpayer was able to establish the following 
summaries: 25 
17 See, e.g., Jordan Marsh Co. v. Assessors of Quincy, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2278, 331 
N.E.2d 61, in which the parties stipulated that property in Quincy was assessed at 40 
percent of fair cash value. See also Assessors of Lynn v. Shop-Lease Co., 1974 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 107,307 N.E.2d 310,311. In thejordan Marsh case, the Court indicated 
in a footnote that its acceptance of the stipulation was not intended to weaken its hold-
ing in the Sudbury case. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2278 n.l, 331 N .E.2d at 61 n.l. 
18 348 Mass. 366, 203 N.E.2d 811 (1965). 
19 /d. at 377, 203 N.E.2d at 819. 
20 See id. at 377-78, 203 N.E.2d at 820. 
21 358 Mass. 554, 265 N.E.2d 848 (1971). 
22 /d. at 555, 265 N.E.2d at 849. 
23 /d. at 555-59 & n.2, 265 N.E.2d at 849-50 & n.2. 
24 /d. at 555, 265 N.E.2d at 849-50. 
25 /d. at 556, 265 N.E.2d at 850. 
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Number 
of Sales 
in Prior 
Year Next Year 
1964 318 
1965 269 
1966 265 
TOTAL 852 
Assessment-Sales 
Price Ratio 
(1) 
0%-19% 
20%-29% 
30%-39% 
40%-49% 
50%-59% 
60%-or over 
TABLE A 
Assessment-
Total Total Sales 
Sales Assessed Price 
Value Value Ratio 
$ 5,500,000 $2,238,800 40.7% 
4,961,100 1,922,700 . 38.8% 
5,215,550 2,113,000 40.5% 
$15,676,650 
TABLE B 
$6,274,500 40.0% 
(2) 
1964 
4 
32 
135 
32 
20 
35 
Parcels of Property Having 
Column ( 1) Assessment-Sales 
Price Ratio 
(3) 
1965 
3 
46 
125 
60 
12 
23 
(4) 
1966 
7 
53 
116 
42 
21 
26 
The Court held that, as a matter of law, this evidence was sufficient 
to support an inference of disproportionate assessment, commenting 
as follows: 
The evidence was in various respects somewhat disorderly and 
vague. Stores, however, did show that most real estate sale prices 
in Somerville during the years immediately preceding the three 
assessment years ( 1964-1966) had far exceeded the assessments of 
the same properties as of the next succeeding January 1. Actual 
sales are, of course, very strong evidence of fair market value, for 
they represent what a buyer has been willing to pay to a seller for 
a particular property . . . . When one considers 852 sales in a city 
over a three-year period there is basis for believing that these, on 
the average, reflect a market based on arms length negotiations. 
Although it is unlikely that any large part of all the properties in 
9
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a city, or particular district of a city, will be sold in any three-year 
period, the volume of sales here considered represents a substan-
tial sampling, particularly if widely distributed as these sales ap-
pear to have been. Most sales listed were at prices strongly sug-
gesting that residential properties had been sold. Comparison of 
the aggregate sales prices with the aggregate tax assessments of 
those properties in the year following the sale [see Table A, 
supra], gives strong support to an inference that the substantially 
consistent aggregate assessment-aggregate sales price ratio reflects 
general assessment policy in the city. Particularly is this so ... 
where indications concerning certain prior years are generally 
comparable to the figures for the most pertinent years. It is hard 
to imagine any other method of testing assessment policy likely to 
be as informative. 26 
The First National Stores case involved the years 1964 through 1966 
and the taxpayer introduced evidence of the ratio of assessed value to 
sales price of most of the real estate sold in Somerville during the 
years 1960 through 1965. The collection and compilation of this data 
clearly was an expensive and time-consuming task. Moreover, to con-
duct such a study in a city such as Boston would be even more dif-
ficult because of the larger volume of sales occurring each year. 27 Yet, 
the Court's opinion in the First National Stores case gives no indication 
as to whether less complete data would have been sufficient. 
During the Survey year, two disproportionate assessment cases did 
reach the Supreme Judicial Court. Unfortunately, both were decided 
on procedural grounds and thus neither sheds any additional light on 
the quantum of proof necessary to show disproportionate assessment. 
In Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, 28 the taxpayers had introduced at 
the Appellate Tax Board hearing an exhibit consisting of a list of sales 
and assessments purporting to show that the assessors had discrimi-
nated against their property.29 In addition, the taxpayers had intro-
duced evidence to show that their property was overassessed in rela-
tion to four other specific properties in the town. 30 The Board held 
for the town, finding that the four specific properties were not com-
parable. The Board also declined to consider the list of sales on the 
grounds that the taxpayers failed to offer evidence "as to the types of 
properties involved, whether personal property was part of the sale or 
whether they in any way were comparable to the subject property."31 
On appeal, the taxpayers urged that the Board erred in deciding that 
26 Id. at 560-61 & n.7, 265 N.E.2d at 852-53 & n.7. 
27 For example, instruments recorded at the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds from 
July I, 1972 to june 30, 1973 fill about 95 complete books, each with over 700 pages. 
28 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1684,329 N.E.2d at 117. 
29 /d. at 1688, 329 N.E.2d at 120. 
3° Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, No. 64797, at 2 (App. Tax Bd. Oct. 3, 1974). 
31 /d. at 3. 
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they had not proved their case. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed, 
holding that, in the absence of a stenographic transcript of the pro-
ceedings before the Board, the Court was foreclosed from considering 
whether, as a matter of law, the evidence before the Board warranted 
its findings. 32 
The second case, Assessors of Kingston v. Sgarzi, 33 was an appeal by· 
the assessors from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board reducing 
the assessed value of the taxpayers' real estate from $6,000 to $1,800. 
The assessors urged that no deci~ion for the taxpayers was permissible 
in light of exhibits introduced at the hearing tending to show that the 
taxpayers had purchased the property for a price more than twice the 
original assessed value.34 Since there was no statement of agreed facts, 
report by the Board, or transcript of the proceedings, the Court first 
considered the question whether the assessors' contentions were 
reviewable. The Court concluded th,at the issue raised on appeal was 
fundamentally different from that involved in the Coomey case-i.e., 
not whether the findings of the Board were warranted in light of all 
the evidence, but whether the findings of the Board were permissible 
as a matter of law in light of certain specific exhibits. 35 Turning to the 
assessors' contentions, the Court found them without merit. The tax-
payers' petition had alleged disproportionate assessment and the 
Court held that, on the meager record before it, it was compelled to 
assume that the taxpayer had introduced sufficient evidence to justify 
a finding in accord with the allegation. 36 
§11.4. Real Estate Tax: Methods of Valuation. The decision of 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Cor-
porations & Taxation 1 has generated much discussion concerning the 
propriety and relative merits of different methods of valuation. The 
City of Boston, with its heavy concentration of industrial and com-
mercial property, has been a strong supporter of the capitalization of 
income approach. The State Tax Commission, on the other hand, has 
seemed to favor the comparable sales approach. 
Two decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year 
are relevant in connection with this ongoing discussion. In jordan 
Marsh Co. v. Assessors of Quincy, 2 the Court affirmed a decision of the 
Appellate Tax Board determining the value of the taxpayer's prop-
erty primarily on the basis of its original cost. 3 The Court noted that 
32 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1689, 329 N.E.2d at 120. 
33 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1691,329 N.E.2d 121. 
34 /d. at 1693, 329 N.E.2d at 123. 
35 /d. at 1693-94, 329 N.E.2d at 123. 
36 /d. at 1696, 329 N.E.2d at 124. 
§11.4. 1 1974 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 2405, 321 N.E.2d 641. See§ 11.3 supra. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2278, 331 N.E.2d 61. 
3 /d. at 2280, 331 N.E.2d at 62. 
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since the property was new, depreciation was not a significant factor. 4 
In Assessors of Weymouth v. Tammy Brook Co., 5 the Board relied on the 
capitalization of income approach to determine the value of a number 
of two-story apartment buildings, the rentals from which were subject 
to regulation by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. 6 The Court affirmed the Board's decision, noting that 
the capitalization of income approach was "particularly appropriate in 
light of the Federal restrictions on the income which may be realized 
from the project." 7 
§11.5. Abatement Applications: Time for Filing. Section 59 of 
chapter 59 of the General Laws provides that if a local real estate tax 
bill is first sent out after September first of a year, the person assessed 
may apply for an abatement on or before the thirtieth day after the 
date on which the bill is first sent out. In Canron, Inc. v. Assessors of 
Everett, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the same time require-
ments apply to persons other than the person assessed, even though 
such persons must pay the tax before they apply for an abatement. 2 
The Court also held that the tax bill involved in the case was effective 
to begin the running of the thirty-day period even though it was not 
mailed in accordance with the statutory requirements.3 The Court 
held that the taxpayer was not substantially prejudiced by the 
collector's failure to comply with the technical terms of the statute. 4 
Although not startling in itself, the Court's decision has some in-
teresting implications in connection with the recent change-over of 
cities and towns from a December 31 to a June 30 fiscal year. 5 In 
connection with the change-over, a "one-shot" six-month tax bill was 
issued for the first six months of 197 4 and section 57 of chapter 59 of 
the General Laws was amended to provide that regular tax bills issued 
4 !d. 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2223, 331 N.E.2d 531. 
6 !d., 331 N.E.2d at 532. 
7 Id. 
§11.5. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 322 N.E.2d 83. 
2 !d. at 86, 322 N.E.2d at 85. 
3 !d. at 89, 322 N.E.2d at 86. 
4 !d. G.L. c. 60, § 3, directs the collector to "send notice to each person assessed, resi-
dent or non-resident, of the amount of his tax; if mailed, it shall be postpaid and di-
rected to the town where the assessed person resided on January first of the year in 
which the tax was assessed." Early decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court indicated 
that tax bills not sent in accordance with the statute were ineffective, Hunt v. Holston, 
185 Mass. 137, 138-39, 70 N.E. 96, 97 (1904), or a "nullity," Bartlett v. Tufts, 241 Mass. 
96, 98, 134 N.E. 630, 631 (1922). More recent decisions have held that minor ir-
regularities in a tax bill do not render it ineffective if the taxpayer's rights are not prej-
udiced as a result of the errors. Trustees of the Hawes Fund in Boston v. City of Bos-
ton, 346 Mass. 26, 27, 190 N.E.2d liS, 120 (1963); McManus v. Boston, 320 M::-ss. 585, 
70 N.E.2d 819,820 (1947). 
5 See Acts of 1969, c. 849, I'JS amended by Acts of 1970, c. 52; Acts of 1970, c. 194; Acts 
of 1971, c. 766; Acts of 1973, c. 52; and Acts of 1974, c. 59. 
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in 1974 and in subsequent years will be payable in two equal install-
ments, one due in November of the year of assessment and the other 
due the following May. 6 Despite this change, however, taxes are still 
ordinarily assessed to the person who was the record owner of the 
land on January first of the year of assessment. 7 Thus, if a taxpayer 
buys land after January first of a given year, the tax bill for the year 
(payable one-half in November of that year and one-half in the fol-
lowing May) will ordinarily be issued in the name of the preceding 
owner. As a person other than the "person assessed," the new owner 
will have to pay "the tax" before he is eligible to apply for an 
abatement. 8 
In light of Canron, it seems clear that the new owner will be sub-
ject to the same time limits as the person assessed. Thus, he must file 
the abatement application by October first of the year of the bill or, if 
the bill was first sent out after September first, within thirty days of its 
mailing. Accordingly, unless the words "the tax" in the third sentence 
of section 59 of chapter 59 of the General Laws are construed to 
mean only the first installment of the tax-a result which seems 
somewhat unlikely-this means that the new owner will have to pay 
both installments of the tax by October 1, or by the thirtieth day after 
the bill was mailed, whichever is later, in order to be in a position to 
apply for an abatement. 
No doubt this trap for the unwary, if it is one, is an unintentional 
by-product of the shift from annual to semi-annual property tax bills. 
However, this is likely to be of little solace to those affected. The 
problem may be particularly acute for new homeowners. Typically, 
new homeowners are short of cash and thus raising the funds neces-
sary to prepay the second installment of the tax may be particularly 
burdensome. Moreover, many communities make it a practice to reas-
sess property when it changes hands. Thus, new homeowners are 
perhaps more likely to want to apply for an abatement than the aver-
age taxpayer. A legislative solution seems clearly called for. 
§11.6. Exemption for Property of Another Municipality. In Tax 
Collector of North Reading v. Town of Reading, 1 the Supreme Judicial 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 59. 
7 See G.L. c. 59, § 11. The taxes are also a lien on the land from January 1 of the year 
of assessment. G.L. c. 60, § 37. This has some surprising results in the case of taxable 
property transferred to an exempt charity after the first of the year. Under these cir-
cumstances, the charity's exemption may not be available for up to 18 months. For ex-
ample, if taxable property is transferred to an exempt charity on January 2 of a par-
ticular year, a regular bill will be issued the following fall in the name of the preceding 
owner, payable one-half on the first of November and one-half on the following May l. 
The parties should be aware of this and agree between themselves as to who will pay 
the tax. 
8 G.L. c. 59, §59. See Boston Five Cents Savings Bank v. Assessors of Boston, 311 
Mass. 415,41 N.E.2d 283 (1942). 
§11.6. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2219,319 N.E.2d 887. 
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Court reaffirmed the long-established principle that property of one 
municipality located within another municipality is exempt from local 
tax so long as it is actually devoted to a public use. 2 The case arose 
when the Town of North Reading sought to recover from the Town 
of Reading unpaid personal property taxes assessed against personal 
property of the Reading Municipal Light Department located in 
North Reading and used to supply electricity to customers there. 
In 1969, in Gas & Electric Commissioners v. Assessors of Lakeville, 3 the 
Supreme Judicial Court, on similar facts, held that personal property 
of the Town of Middleborough, which was located and used to supply 
electricity to customers in the adjoining town of Lakeville, was exempt 
from tax by the latter town. 4 North Reading sought to distinguish the 
Middleborough case, noting that the statute authorizing Middleborough 
to supply electricity to customers outside its boundaries5 contained 
language supporting the exemption whereas the statute in Reading's 
case6 did not. The Court, however, declined to read the Middleborough 
case as narrowly based on the particular wording of the statute there 
involved. Instead, the Court held that the case was based on general 
principles of "propriety, justice and expediency" and on the long-
established rule that, absent clear statutory authorization to tax, prop-
erty of a municipality is exempt from local tax so long as devoted to a 
public use. 7 Reviewing the relevant statutes, the Court concluded that 
there was no clear authorization to impose the tax. 8 
§11.7. Charitable Exemption: Use of Property on January 
l. Under section 5 of chapter 59 of the General Laws, 1 real estate 
owned by a "charitable organization," as defined therein, is exempt 
from local property tax if it is occupied by the organization or its of-
ficers for the purposes for which the organization was organized or by 
another charitable organization or organizations or its or their officers 
for the purposes of such other charitable organization or organiza-
tions. In Assessors of Hamilton v. Iron Rail Fund of Girls Clubs of America, 
Inc., 2 the issue was whether certain real estate was occupied on 
January 1, 1972 for the purposes for which the taxpayer was or-
ganized. 
The taxpayer, Iron Rail Fund of Girls Clubs of America, Inc. ("Iron 
Rail"), concededly a "charitable organization" within the meaning of 
section 5 of chapter 59, was organized in 1954 under chapter 180 of 
2 /d. at 2222,319 N.E.2d at 889. 
3 355 Mass. 387, 245 N.E.2d 249 (1969). 
4 /d. at 389-90, 245 N .E.2d at 250-51. 
5 G.L. c. 164, § 47. 
6 Acts of 1909, c. 369. 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2222, 319 N.E.2d at 889. 
8 !d. at 2226-30, 319 N.E.2d at 891-92. 
§11.7. I G.L. c. 59,§ 5, cl. 3d. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 882, 325 N.E.~d 568. 
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the General Laws as a subsidiary of Girls Clubs of America, Inc. 
("Girls Clubs").3 The purpose of Iron Rail was to operate a summer 
camp for girls. Shortly after it was organized, Iron Rail acquired the 
real estate in question, 296 acres of land in the towns of Hamilton, 
Wenham and Essex, for that purpose. Every summer thereafter, 
through 1970, Iron Rail operated a summer camp on the land. In 
early 1971, however, it suffered a series of misfortunes, including the 
incapacitation of its top administrators, a fire in the camp's main 
building, and the loss of the backing of the camp's principal financial 
supporter. As a result, its 1971 camping program was curtailed al-
though not eliminated entirely. At the end of the 1971 summer ses-
sion, the buildings were closed and the furniture stored in accordance 
with the procedures followed in prior years.4 
In September of 1971, the organization's Board of Directors met 
and voted to petition the Supreme Judicial Court for dissolution in 
accordance with section 11A of chapter 180 of the General Laws, and 
to convey the Iron Rail assets to Girls Clubs.5 At the same meeting, 
however, the Board of Directors also directed that a committee be 
formed to determine whether the taxpayer should continue the same 
type of camping program if the funds to finance the program should 
become available. Apart from some further meetings and conferences, 
nothing further occurred until after the relevant assessment date, 
January 1, 1972.6 
On these facts, the Appellate Tax Board held the property exempt 
from tax, finding that the use of the property as a summer camp had 
not been discontinued as of the January 1, 1972 assessment date. 7 
The assessors appealed. Although the assessors did not challenge the 
Board's finding that, as of January 1, 1972, the property was being 
used, or unused, in the same manner as in prior years, they argued 
that the property was not held for use as a summer camp on the as-
sessment date in light of the following subsequent events: (1) the 
taxpayer did file a petition for dissolution with the Supreme Judicial 
Court in February, 1972; (2) the taxpayer listed the property for sale 
in July, 1972; (3) the taxpayer conveyed all its assets to Girls Clubs, 
also in July, 1972; (4) the taxpayer was dissolved by order of the Su-
preme Judicial Court in August, 1972; and (5) the taxpayer did not 
conduct a camp at all in 1972.8 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected 
the assessor's contention, and affirmed the decision of the Board. 9 
The Court noted that, in the Commonwealth, January 1 of each 
3 !d. at 884, 325 N.E.2d at 569. 
4 Id. at 884-86, 325 N.E.2d at 569-70. 
5 !d. at 886, 325 N.E.2d at 570. 
6 Id. at 886-87, 325 N.E.2d at 570. 
7 See id. at 883, 887, 325 N.E.2d at 569, 570. 
8 !d. at 888-89, 325 N.E.2d at 570-71. 
9 Jd. at 893, 325 N.E.2d at 572. 
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year is the assessment date. Quoting from its decision in Trustees of 
Amherst College v. Assessors of Amherst, 10 the Court said that "it is the use 
of the property at the time when the tax is assessed which determines 
whether it is exempt from taxation or not." 11 Conceding that Iron 
Rail's intentions as of January 1, 1972 may have been relevant in de-
termining the status of the property on the assessment date, the Court 
nevertheless held that the fact that it did not operate a summer camp 
in 1972 did not prove that it never intended to do so. 12 The Court 
concluded that the evidence before the Board amply warranted its 
finding that as of January 1, 1972 the taxpayer did intend to conduct 
a summer camp in 1972.13 
The assessors urged that the Court's decision in Boston Society of Re-
demptionist Fathers v. City of Boston 14 supported their position. In that 
case, the Court held the charitable exemption unavailable where the 
organization was not using the property for charitable purposes on 
the assessment date, even though it may have had an intention of 
using it for such purposes later in the year. 15 However, the Court 
found Redemptionist Fathers plainly distinguishable. In that case, the 
organization had never used the property for charitable purposes. 
Iron Rail, on the other hand, had established a long pattern of sea-
sonal use entitling its expressions of intention to more weight. 16 
§ll.8. Charitable Exemption: Foreign Charitable Corpora-
tions. Section 5 of chapter 59 of the General Laws1 exempts from 
local property tax personal property and real estate of a charitable 
corporation only if it is "incorporated in the Commonwealth." In Mary 
C. Wheeler School, Inc. v. Assessors of Seekonk, 2 this discrimination against 
foreign charitable corporations was held violative of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 3 
The taxpayer, a Rhode Island nonbusiness corporation, operated a 
day and boarding school for children. Its main campus was in Provi-
dence, Rhode Island, but it also owned a 122-acre tract of land in 
Seekonk, a few miles away, which it used for recreation and sports. 4 
The assessors conceded that the taxpayer satisfied all of the require-
10 193 Mass. 168, 178, 79 N.E.2d 248, 250 (1906). 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 889-90, 325 N.E.2d at 571. 
12 /d. at 890, 325 N .E.2d at 571. 
13 /d. at 891, 325 N.E.2d at 571. 
14 129 Mass. 178 (1880). 
15 /d. at 182. G.L. c. 59, § 5, d. 3d extends the charitable exemption to real estate 
purchased by a charitable organization "with the purpose of removal thereto, until such 
removal, but not for more than two years after such purchase." 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 891-92, 325 N.E.2d at 571-72. 
§11.8. I G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 3d. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2311,331 N.E.2d 888. 
3 !d. at 2325, 331 N.E.2d at 893. 
4 /d. at 2311,331 N.E.2d at 888. 
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ments for exemption save that having to do with the state of its incor-
poration. Thus, the issue framed for the Court's decision was a very 
narrow one: could the taxpayer be denied the exemption concededly 
otherwise available merely because it was incorporated in Rhode Is-
land rather than in Massachusetts.5 
Although observing that states ordinarily are given wide latitude in 
drawing classifications for tax purposes, the Supreme Judicial Court 
noted that there were limits and observed that courts have usually 
found the limits exceeded where the distinction drawn is one which 
favors state residents over nonresidents. 6 Relying on the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in a similar case, WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of 
Glassboro, 7 the Court held impermissible this discrimination against 
foreign charitable corporations. 8 
The WHYY, Inc. case involved a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation 
that operated a radio station with broadcasting facilities located in 
New Jersey. In accordance with New Jersey law, 9 the corporation had 
registered and qualified to do business in the state. 10 The corporation 
applied for a local tax exemption, but its application was denied be-
cause the statute11 then in force in New Jersey limited the availability 
of the exemption to domestic charitable corporations. 12 The Supreme 
Court, reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court, held that the New 
Jersey statute offended the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 13 The Supreme Court stated that although a state may 
impose conditions on the entry of foreign corporations, once it has 
permitted them to enter it must treat them equally with domestic cor-
porations as regards matters of ad valorem taxation. 14 
Under Massachusetts law as it existed at the time the Mary C. 
Wheeler School case arose, foreign charitable corporations could not 
register to do business in the Commonwealth in the same manner as 
foreign profit-making corporations. 15 The assessors argued, and the 
Appellate Tax Board held, that WHYY, Inc. was distinguishable on 
this basis. 16 The Board suggested that, because of the absence of a 
5 !d. at 2313, 331 N .E.2d at 889. 
6 !d. at 2314, 331 N.E.2d at 889, citing Frost v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 293 N.E.2d 862, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803 (1973). 
7 393 U.S. 117 (1968) (per curiam). 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2325, 331 N.E.2d at 893. 
9 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14:15-2. 
10 393 U.S. at 118. . 
11 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 54:4-3.6. See 393 U.S. at 118 n.2. 
12 See 393 U.S. at 118 & n.2. 
13 !d. at 120. 
14 !d. at 119, quoting Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1949). 
15 See G.L. c. 181, § I, as amended through Acts of 1962, c. 750, §55. Effective January 
I, 1974, the definition of a "foreign corporation" for purposes of G.L. c. 181 was 
broadened and foreign nonprofit corporations are now included. Acts of 1973, c. 844, 
§I. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2321-22, 331 N.E.2d at 892. 
16 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2322,331 N.E.2d at 892. 
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qualification system, Massachusetts would lack control over the regula-
tion of foreign charitable corporations and would be unable to revoke 
their charter if they violated their public trust. 17 Reversing the Board, 
the Court noted that the provisions of sections 8 through 8J of chap-
ter 12 of the General Laws, which were in force during the relevant 
period, served much the same function as did the qualification system 
in New Jersey. 18 Under these provisions, the Attorney General of the 
Commonwealth is given broad powers to supervise and control both 
foreign and domestic charities. 19 Dismissing as unimportant such dif-
ferences as there were between this system and the qualification sys-
tem in New Jersey involved in the WHYY, Inc. case,20 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held the latter decision controlling. 21 In an important 
footnote, however, the Court indicated that it was merely opening the 
door for foreign charitable corporations to apply for exemption from 
local tax. 22 In deciding whether such foreign corporations are "chari-
table" within the meaning of section 5 of chapter 59 of the General 
Laws,23 Massachusetts law will continue to govern. 24 
§11.9. Charitable Exemption: Cemeteries. Section 5 of chapter 
59 of the General Laws' provides that there is an exemption from 
local property tax for "[c]emeteries ... so long as dedicated to the 
burial of the dead, and buildings owned by religious nonprofit corpo-
rations and used exclusively in the administration of such cemeteries 
.... " In Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Assessors of Braintree, 2 the issue was 
the taxability of real estate of a cemetery that was used as part of its 
cemetery operations, but that was not actually dedicated to the inter-
ment of bodies. The Appeals Court affirmed a decision of the Appel-
late Tax Board holding that cemetery land can be "dedicated to the 
burial of the dead," even though not actually used for the interment 
of bodies, if it is used in connection with necessary cemetery 
functions. 3 
Despite the limited application of the court's holding, the case is of 
17 !d. 
18 See id. at 2322-24, 331 N .E.2d at 892-93. 
19 G.L. c. 12, §§ 8, SE, SF, SH, 8]. 
20 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2324, 331 N.E.2d at 893. 
21 !d. at 2325, 331 N .E.2d at 893. 
22 See id. at 2320 n.5, 331 N.E.2d at 891 n.5. 
23 G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 3d. 
24 !d. 
§11.9. 1 G.L. c. 59,§ 5, cl. 12th. 
2 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 943, 317 N.E.2d 831. 
3 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 946, 317 N.E.2d at 833, citing Assessors of Sharon 
v. Knollwood Cemetery, 355 Mass. 584, 246 N.E.2d 660 (1969). In Knollwood Cemetery, 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that "the planning and substantial actual use of parts 
of a defined area of land for cemetery purposes may properly be found ... to consti-
tute a dedication of the whole of that land to cemetery use .... " 355 Mass. at 589, 246 
N.E.2d at 664. But cf. Woodlawn Cemetery v. Inhabitants of Everett, 118 Mass. 354 
(1875). 
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general interest in at least two respects. Initially, it provides further 
support for the practice of partial exemption and partial taxation of 
the same piece of property. 4 At the hearing before the Appellate Tax 
Board, the parties stipulated that certain portions of the real estate 
were used for noncemetery functions (i.e., 15 percent of one building, 
20 percent of a garage and 18 acres of wetlands}. 5 Although no ex-
emption was allowed with respect to these portions, that the property 
was not used exclusively for cemetery purposes was not considered 
fatal to the allowance of an exemption for the remainder of the 
property. 6 The second interesting aspect of the case is that it was only 
the second appeal from the Appellate Tax Board transferred down to 
the Appeals Court by the Supreme Judicial Court. 7 Unlike decisions 
of most lower courts in the Commonwealth, decisions of the Appellate 
Tax Board are appealable directly to the Supreme Judicial Court. 8 
§11.10. Charitable Exemption: Parsonages. Chapter 283 of the 
Acts of 1975 amends clause 11th of section 5 of chapter 59 of the 
General Laws. Previously, clause 11th provided for a limited local 
property tax exemption (up to $20,000 in value per parsonage) for 
parsonages owned by, or held in trust for the use of, any religious or-
ganization. The amendment limits the exemption to parsonages 
owned by or "held in irrevocable trust, for the exclusive benefit of' 
such religious organizations. Prior to the amendment, it might have 
been possible for an enterprising parson, who was not provided with a 
pa:r:sonage by his flock, to transfer his home to a revocable trust for 
the benefit of his denomination and claim the benefit of the exemp-
tion provided in clause 11th. The amendment will put a stop to any 
such practice for the future. 
§11.11. Personal Property Tax: Exemption for Household 
Effects. Section 5 of chapter 59 of the General Laws1 exempts from 
local personal property tax a person's household furniture and effects 
if stored in a public warehouse, or used or commonly kept in or about 
the dwelling of which he is the owner of record or for the use of 
which he is obligated to pay rent "and which is the place of his 
domicile." The conditions on the availability of this exemption have 
often come as an unpleasant surprise to two classes of people: (1) 
those who own vacation homes in the Commonwealth, and (2) bene-
ficiaries of trusts holding title to residential real estate that the bene-
4 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 947, 317 N.E.2d at 833-34, citing Milton Hosp. & 
Convalescent Home v. Assessors of Milton, 360 Mass. 63, 70, 271 N.E.2d 745, 749 
(1971). 
5 See 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 944,317 N.E.2d at 832. 
"See id. at 947,317 N.E.2d at 832. 
7 The first was Sarris v. Assessors of Swampscott, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 577, 
315 N.E.2d 892. 
8 G.L. c. 58A, § 13. 
§ 1l.l1 I G.L. c. 59, § 5, d. 20th. 
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ficiaries are entitled to occupy_ rent-free. 
In Weinstock v. Town of Hull, 2 the plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents 
who owned summer homes in Hull but who were domiciled elsewhere 
in the Commonwealth, filed a bill for declaratory relief in the 
superior court challenging the constitutionality of this alleged dis-
crimination against nonresidents under both the United States and 
Massachusetts Constitutions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed 
the decree of the superior court upholding the constitutionality of the 
tax. 3 
Noting that a literal interpretation of the Massachusetts 
Constitution's requirement that taxation be "proportional and 
reasonable"4 could lead to the invalidation of all exemptions, the 
Court held that the Legislature has the right "to grant exemptions 
which have a reasonable relationship to the constitutional purpose of 
equality and proportionality, although lacking mathematical 
precision."5 The Court said that it regarded the distinction between 
household furniture and effects kept in or near a person's domicile, 
and those that are not, as a reasonable one "not productive of uncon-
stitutional disproportionality."6 The Court noted that each taxpayer 
who has household furniture and effects in a dwelling that he owns or 
rents is entitled to the exemption with respect to such property if the 
dwelling is the place of his domicile. In this respect, the Court ob-
served, there is complete equality of treatment among all potential 
taxpayers. 7 The Court found that the loss of the exemption in the 
community where a person has a vacation home presented no greater 
prospect of disproportionality of taxation than the exemption itself, or 
some dollar limit on the exemption, both of which have been upheld. 8 
B. SALES AND uSE TAXES 
§11.12. Sales Tax: Immunity of Federal Reserve Banks. In 
Federal Reserve Bank v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 1 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was called upon to 
decide whether a Massachusetts sales tax could be collected on build-
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 531, 323 N.E.2d 867. 
3 !d. at 537, 323 N.E.2d at 870. 
4 MASS. CaNST. pt. II, c. I, §I, art. IV. 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 534, 323 N.E.2d at 869. 
6 Id. at 535, 323 N.E.2d at 869. 
7 Id. at 535-36, 323 N.E.2d at 869. 
8 !d. at 536, 323 N.E.2d at 869. See Newhall v. Assessors of Brookline, 329 Mass. 100, 
104, 106 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1952); Day v. City of Lawrence, 167 Mass. 371, 372, 374, 45 
N.E. 751, 752 (1897). In Weinstock, the Court also held that the denial of an exemption 
for personal property in vacation homes did not violate the fourteenth amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 536, 323 N.E.2d at 86!:1. 
§11.12. 1 520 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1975). 
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ing materials and supplies purchased for use in the construction of 
the Bank's new office building located near South Station in down-
town Boston. The case arose when the Commissioner of Corporations 
and Taxation refused to issue an exemption certificate under section 
6(£) of chapter 64H of the General Laws, which exempts sales of mat-
erials and supplies to be used in the construction of government-
owned buildings "used exclusively for public purposes," because of 
plans to rent some of the office space in the new building to private 
tenants. 2 To circumvent the position taken by the Commissioner, the 
Bank amended its contract with the general contractor to provide that 
the Bank itself, and not the contractor or its subcontractors, would 
purchase all necessary materials and supplies. 3 The Commissioner 
took the position that this "end run" was unsuccessful because, among 
other things, the general contractor remained in substance, if not in 
form, the true purchaser. 4 The First Circuit disagreed and held the 
purchases exempt from tax. 5 
Relying upon section 531 of title 12 of the United States Code, which 
exempts Federal Reserve Banks from state and local taxes other than 
taxes on real estate, and upon the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 6 the 
Court reasoned that no tax would be permissible if, in light of the 
contract amendment, the Bank were entitled to be treated as the 
purchaser of the materials. 7 Then, turning to whether or not the con-
tract change was effective to accomplish that result, the Court held8 
that it was, relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock. 9 
In Kern-Limerick, the Supreme Court held that no state sales tax 
could be imposed on the purchase of materials and supplies used by a 
government contractor pursuant to a "cost-plus-fixed-fee" contract 
2 !d. at 223. 
3Jd. 
4 /d. 
5 /d. at 225. 
6 392 u.s. 339 ( 1968). 
7 520 F.2d at 224. The district court had held that the materials and supplies were 
exempt from the sales tax under G.L. c. 64H, §§ 6(d) and (f). Federal Reserve Bank v. 
Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 382 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D. Mass. 1974). G.L. c. 
64H, § 6(d), exempts sales to the United States and its "agencies." G.L. c. 64H, § 6(£), 
exempt sales of building materials and supplies to be used in the construction of build-
ings owned by or held in trust for governmental bodies described in G.L. c. 64H, 
§ 6(d), which are used "exclusively" for public purposes. By shifting the basis of the 
holding in the case to 12 U.S.C. § 531, the First Circuit was able to avoid the 
Commissioner's contentions that (1) the Bank was not an "agency" of the United States 
within the meaning of the statute, see First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 353 Mass. 172, 176, 229 N.E.2d 245, 248 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 
U.S. 339 ( 1968), and (2) the building was not to be used "exclusively" for public pur-
poses, cf Chatham Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 362 Mass. 216, 219, 285 N.E.2d 420, 
422 (1972). 
8 520 F.2d at 224. 
9 347 u.s. 110 (1954). 
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that provided that title to all such materials was to pass directly from 
the vendor to the United States government. 10 The Commissioner ar-
gued that Kern-Limerick was no longer good law.U Nonetheless, sub-
sequent to the oral argument in the case, the Supreme Court handed 
down two decisions citing Kern-Limerick with approval. 12 In light of 
these decisions, the First Circuit found itself unable to conclude that 
Kern-Limerick was not controlling. 13 Noting that this was "an area in-
volving distinctions which are often without obvious differences," 14 
the court commented: 
What is "form" and what "substance" can be argued either way in 
the present transaction. Since the materials are destined to be in-
corporated in the government building, their brief ownership by a 
private contractor is arguably merely "formal;" the real party in 
interest may be the Government. Conversely, of course, the 
Government's assertion of title earlier than might be usual may be 
called "formalistic." However, to insure predictability in a situation 
like this, much can be said for giving controlling weight to the 
terms of the contract. 15 
§11.13. Use Tax on Ships Built Outside Massachusetts. Boston 
Tow Boat Co. v. State Tax Commission 1 was an appeal from a decision of 
the Appellate Tax Board. The Board upheld a use tax assessed on a 
123-ton harbor tug that the taxpayer purchased in Louisiana and 
brought to Boston for use in its business here. There was no question 
as to the propriety of the assessment from a statutory standpoint. The 
taxpayer, however, challenged the constitutionality of the statutes im-
posing the tax because no sales or use tax would have been incurred 
had the vessel been built in and purchased from a Massachusetts 
shipyard.2 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Board, agreeing 
with the taxpayer that this discrimination against vessels constructed 
outside the state was clearly unconstitutional as a burden on interstate 
commerce.3 In reaching this decision, the Court relied on the rule laid 
10 !d. at 122-23. 
11 520 F.2d at 225. The Commissioner argued that Kern-Limerick was abandoned, if 
not overruled, by the "Michigan" Cases-City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 
355 U.S. 489 (1958); and United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United 
States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 ( 1958). 
12 United States v. Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599, 610 (1975); Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 
u.s. 200, 204 (1975). 
13 520 F.2d at 225. 
14 !d. at 223. 
15 !d. at 225 n.l. 
§ll.l3. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2275,319 N.E.2d 908. 
2 !d. at 2277, 319 N.E.2d at 910. G.L. c. 64H, § 6(o), exempts from the sales tax "sales 
of vessels or barges of fifty tons burden or over when constructed in the commonwealth 
and sold by builders thereof." G.L. c. 641, § 7(b); exempts from use tax sales exempt 
under G.L. c. 64H. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2282, 319 N.E.2d at 912. 
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down in the 1963 United States Supreme Court case, Halliburton Oil 
Well Cementing Co. v. Reily: 4"[E]qua1 treatment for in-state and out-of-
state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid 
use tax on goods imported from out-of-state."5 
§11.14. Sales and Use Tax: Prizes Awarded in Amusement Games. 
In Prince v. State Tax Commission, 1 the issue was how prizes awarded at 
amusement games were to be taxed under the sales and use tax law. 
The taxpayers, who operated amusement games at Lincoln Park in 
North Dartmouth, argued that the prizes were purchased for the 
purpose of resale in the ordinary course of their business. Thus, they 
claimed that the purchase of the objects was exempt from sales tax 
under section 1(13) of chapter 64H of the General Laws2 and from 
use tax under section 1(5) of Chapter 64I of the General Laws. 3 
Under the taxpayer's view, the only amount due the Commonwealth 
was a sales tax on the amounts paid by successful contestants in order 
to participate in the games.4 The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed 
the Appellate Tax Board's decision in favor of the State Tax 
Commission. 5 The Court agreed with the Commission that "the fee 
paid by a contestant in order to play one of these games is not a 'sale 
at retail' under the sales tax law."6 Thus, the Court held that the 
prizes in question were used or consumed by the taxpayers in the 
course of operating the amusements. 7 
§11.15. Sales Tax: Credit Sales. In Continental-Hyannis Furniture 
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a 
vendor's liability for the sales tax arises at the time of the sale, and is 
measured by the full sales price, irrespective of whether the sale is a 
cash sale or a credit sale.2 Thus, if a vendor extends credit to a cus-
tomer, he will be liable for the sales tax on the full sales price even if 
the customer later defaults and the account is not collected. 3 The 
4 373 U.S. 64 (1Y63). 
5 !d. at 70. 
§11.14. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2267,319 N.E.2d 723. 
2 G.L. c. 64H, § 1(13), defines a "sale at retail" as a "sale of tangible personal property 
for any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business." Under G.L. c. 
64H, § 2, the sales tax is imposed only on sales at retail.· 
3 G.L. c. 641, § 1(5), defines "use" as the "exercise of any right or power over tangible 
personal property incident to the ownership of that property, except that it does not in-
clude the sale of that property in the regular course of business." 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2271, 319 N.E.2d at 725. 
5 /d. at 2273,319 N.E.2d at 726. 
6 !d. at 2272, 319 N.E.2d at 725. 
7 !d. at 2273, 319 N.E.2d at 726. 
§11.15. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2015, 319 N.E.2d 618. 
2 /d. at 2016, 319 N.E.2d at 619. 
3 !d. at 2017, 319 N.E.2d at 619. 
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Court said that, despite the seeming inequity of this result, it was 
clearly compelled by the plain terms of the statute.4 Moreover, the 
Court noted that vendors who were unwilling to assume the risk of 
sales tax liability on uncollected accounts could avoid it by requiring 
payment of the tax at the time of sale and financing only the actual 
purchase price. 5 
§11.16. Sales and Use Taxes: Newspaper Advertising Supple-
ments. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Commission 1 was an appeal to the 
Appellate Tax Board from the State Tax Commission's refusal to abate use 
taxes assessed against Sears, Roebuck & Co. ("Sears Roebuck"). The use 
taxes were assessed on the cost of advertising supplements that the taxpayer 
had printed by an out-of-state commercial printer2 and that were sent to 
various newspapers in the Commonwealth for distribution with specified 
editions. 
The agreed statement of htcts filed with the Board indicated that 
each supplement was imprinted with the name and logo of the news-
paper it was intended to accompany, together with the date of the 
particular edition with which it was to be distributed. As each order 
was completed, the printer folded the supplements, selected and re-
tained a common carrier, and shipped the supplements, freight pre-
paid, directly to the particular newspaper involved. Under its separate 
contract with Sears Roebuck, the printer was thereafter reimbursed 
for the transportation charges and paid the invoice cost of the sup-
plements. Upon receipt of the supplements, each newspaper inserted 
them into, and distributed them with, the particular edition they were 
intended to accompany. 3 Sears Roebuck's contract with the news-
papers, separate from its contract with the printer, provided for a fee to 
each newspaper based upon the number of supplements distributed.4 
4 !d. Under G.L. c. 64H, § 2, the sales tax is imposed as a specified percentage of the 
"gross receipts" of the vendor. G.L. c. 64H, § 1(6), defines "gross receipts" as the "total 
sales price" received by vendors as a consideration for retail sales. G.L. c. 64H, 
§ 1(14)(ii), provides that in determining the "sales price," there shall be included "any 
amount for which credit is given to the purchaser by the vendor." 
5 /d. at 2017, 318 N.E.2d at 620. The Court's suggestion may be relatively easy to im-
plement in the case of retail establishments, such as furniture stores, which typically re-
quire a down payment well in excess of the amount of the sales tax. However, its com-
mercial feasibility may be more doubtful in other cases. Large department stores such 
as Jordan Marsh, Sears Roebuck, and Lechmere Sales ordinarily provide their own 
financing and usually require no down payment, even on substantial purchases. These 
stores might find it very difficult, both administratively and competitively, to institute 
the procedures suggested by the Court. 
§11.16. '2 CCH STATE TAx REP .. MAss.' 200-430, at 10,352 (1975). 
2 /d. at 10,353. Apparently I percent of the supplements were purchased from Mass-
achusetts printers. With respect to these, the taxpayer relied only on the first two arguments 
described below. /d. at 10,354. 
3 /d. at I 0,353. 
4 Brief for Appellant at 3. 
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Section 6(M) of chapter 64H of the General Laws exempts from the 
sales tax "[s]ales of newspapers" and General Laws section 7(b) of 
chapter 641 of the General Laws exempts from the use tax sales ex-
empt under chapter 64H. Citing supporting authorities from other 
jurisdictions,5 Sears Roebuck argued that the supplements were ex-
empt from use tax because they were designed, and functioned exclu-
sively, as component parts of newspapers. 6 The taxpayer also argued 
that the supplements were exempt under section 6(r) of chapter 64H 
of the General Laws, which exempts sales of materials "which become 
an ingredient or component part of tangible personal property to be 
sold."7 Finally, Sears Roebuck argued that even if the sale of the sup-
plements would have been taxable had it occurred in Massachusetts, 
no use tax was permissible because it relinquished all control and pos-
session of the supplements outside the Commonwealth when the 
printer delivered them to the common carrier for shipment to the 
newspapers. 8 Section 2 of chapter 641 of the General Laws imposes a 
use tax only when tangible personal property is stored, used, or 
otherwise consumed "in the commonwealth." 
The Board rejected the taxpayer's arguments and held the use 
taxes properly assessed. 9 The Board conceded that the supplements 
would have been exempt if they had been printed directly by the 
newspapers involved rather than by a commercial printer. 10 Nonethe-
less, the Board held that the supplements did not become "part of' a 
newspaper merely because they were distributed "with" or "by" one.U 
Moreover, the Board found that, insofar as it was a question of fact, 
the taxpayer "used or otherwise consumed" the supplements. 12 The 
Board's decision is being appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court by 
the taxpayer. 
§11.17. Sales and Use Taxes: Property Purchased and Shipped to 
Out-Of-State Branch Offices: Commerical Art Work. Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. State Tax Commission 1 was a decision of the 
Appellate Tax Board involving two separate issues. The first con-
5 !d. at 6. See Cal. Reg. 1590, CCH STATE TAx REP., CAL. ,60-225; R.I. Bulletin of Tax 
Administration,Ju1y 1, 1966, CCH STATETAXREP.,R.l. f60-208.50(a). 
6 2 CCH ST;\T)l TAx REP., MAss. t200-430, at 10,354. 
7 See id. 
8 The taxpayer cited as authority for this argument Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Porter-
field, 16 Ohio St. 2d 158, 243 N.E.2d 72 (1968); Mart Realty, Inc. v. Norberg, 111 R.I. 
402, 303 A.2d 361 (1973); Miller Brewing Co. v. Schneider, CCH STATE TAX REP., 
OHIO f200-521 (Bd. of Tax App. 1964); Town & Country Distribs. v. State Tax 
Bureau, Doc. RST-422 (Pa. Bd. of Fin. & Rev., Oct. 23, 1974). Brief for Appellant at 
14, 19, 20, 21. 
9 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. f200-429, at 10,355. 
10 !d. at 10,354. 
II !d. 
12 !d. at 10,355. 
§ 11.17. 1 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. f200-432, at 10,359 (1975). 
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cerned section 1(5) of chapter 641 of the General Laws, which pro-
vides that, for the purposes of the use tax, the terms "store," "stor-
age," and "use" do not include "keeping, retaining, or exercising any 
right or power over tangible personal property for the purpose of 
subsequently transporting it outside the commonwealth for use there-
after solely outside the commonwealth." The taxpayer had purchased 
various office supplies and promotional materials from out-of-state 
vendors. The supplies and materials were shipped to its home office 
in Springfield, and unpacked and stored in its warehouse there. 
Thereafter, as they were needed, the materials and supplies were 
withdrawn from storage and either used by the taxpayer at its home 
office or repackaged and shipped to its various branch offices located 
both within and without the Commonwealth. 2 The issue was whether 
the above-quoted language from section 1(5), exempted from use tax 
that portion of the materials and supplies eventually shipped to the 
out-of-state branch offices. 3 
The State Tax Commission took the position that in order to qual-
ify for the exemption, goods must be purchased for out-of-state use, 
stored in Massachusetts in their original packages, and segregated 
from the taxpayer's general inventory. 4 The taxpayer argued that the 
"original package" doctrine was irrelevant because it only had to do 
with whether or not the state had power to tax,5 and the power of the 
state to tax was conceded. Instead, the taxpayer argued that the ques-
tion was really one of statutory construction and claimed that the re-
strictions imposed by the Commission on the availability of the ex-
emption were not justified. 
The second issue in the case involved section 1 ( 13) of chapter 64H 
of the General Laws, which excludes from the definition of "sale at 
retail," for the purpose of the sales tax, "professional, insurance, or 
personal service transactions which involve no sale or which involve 
sales as inconsequential elements for which no separate charges are 
made." The taxpayer had hired a number of commercial artists to 
prepare, photograph, and develop art designs for use with the 
taxpayer's promotional materials. The amounts paid to the artists in-
cluded payment for their services as well as payment for the materials 
upon which the designs were prepared and developed. The State Tax 
Commission took the position that amounts paid to the artists were 
subject to the sales tax since, in its view, the true substance of the 
transaction was a purchase of art work. 6 The taxpayer argued that the 
2 !d. at I 0,360. 
3 !d. at I 0,361. 
4 !d. at 10,362. 
5 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 545-50 (1959). See Brown 
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,441-42 (1827). 
6 CCH STATE TAX REP. MASS.1 200-432, at 10-362. See State Tax Commission, Sales 
& Use Tax Emergency Reg. No. 10(2) (July 7, 1966). 
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transaction was really a personal service transaction exempt under sec-
tion 1(13).7 
The Appellate Tax Board held for the taxpayers on both issues.8 
With respect to the first issue, the Board ruled that it was immaterial 
that the property was not kept in its original packages. It held that 
property is not subject to tax where it is "retained for the purpose of 
subsequently transporting it outside the Commonwealth for use 
thereafter solely outside the Commonwealth."9 With respect to the 
second issue, the Board held that 
the principle [sic] test of taxability is whether, on the one hand, 
the dominant character of the transaction is the purchase and sale 
of the commercial artist's services, with the paper, cardboard or 
other material upon which the services are rendered regarded as 
inconsequential elements, in which case the transaction is not tax-
able as a sale of tangible personal property, or, on the other hand, 
it is the material upon which the art work is performed that con-
stitutes the real substance of the transaction, in which case, of 
course, the transaction is taxable .... 10 
§11.18. Sales Tax: Purchase or Lease of Motion Pictures For Tele-
vision Broadcasting. R.K.O. General, Inc. v. State Tax Commission 1 was 
a decision of the Appellate Tax Board involving the applicability of 
the sales tax to amounts paid by the taxpayer for the purchase and 
rental of motion pictures shown on its television station, WNAC-TV, 
Channel 7, in Boston. The Board held that the purchase and rental of 
the motion pictures was exempt from sales tax under section 6(r) of 
chapter 64H of the General Laws, which exempts "[s]ales of materials, 
tools and fuel ... which are consumed and used directly ... in the 
operation of the commercial radio broadcasting or television transmis-
sion." The Board held that the word "and" in the phrase "consumed 
and used" was to be construed disjunctively rather than conjunctively 
in order to effectuate what it characterized as the "legislative solic-
itude" for the various communication media apparent in the sales and 
use tax statutes. 2· 
§11.19. Sales Tax: Materials, Supplies and Machinery Purchased 
by a Heating Contractor, In Se(tzer & Co. v. State Tax Commission, 1 
the taxpayer was a heating contractor engaged in the business of sell-
ing, installing, and servicing hot water and steam-generating boilers, 
7 See 2 CCH STATE T A'\ REP., MASS. ,200-432, at 10,362. 
8 !d. 
9 !d. 
10 !d. 
§11.18. 1 2 CCH STATE TAx REP., MAss. '200-417, at 10,333-36 (1975). 
2 Id. at 10,334-35, citing, inter alia, G.L. c. 64H, §§ 6(m), 6(r), 6(s). 
§11.19. 1 2 CCH STATE TAx REP., MAss. '200-434, at 10,365 (1975). 
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the oil-burning equipment used to fire them, and associated controls, 
regulating devices, lines and pipes. Except for a small amount of re-
pair work, the boilers and related items were sold and installed under 
lump sum contracts. 2 The case was an appeal to the Appellate Tax 
Board from the Commission's refusal to abate use taxes assessed 
against the taxpayer on the value of materials, supplies and machinery 
used in the performance of these contracts. 3 The taxpayer claimed 
that the property was not taxable by reason of the exemption pro-
vided by section 6(r) of chapter 64H of the General Laws for "[s]ales 
of materials . . . which become an ingredient or component part of 
tangible personal property to be sold or which are consumed and 
used directly ... in the furnishing of gas, water, steam or electricity 
when delivered to consumers through mains, lines or pipes."4 In addi-
tion, the taxpayer sought relief under the exemption provided by sec-
tion 6(s) for "[s]ales of machinery, or replacement parts thereof, used 
directly and exclusively ... in the furnishing of gas, water, steam or 
electricity when delivered to consumers through mains, lines or 
pipes."5 The Board, noting that the appellant was not engaged in the 
business of furnishing power, gas, water, or steam, held that the ex-
emptions were inapplicable. 6 Moreover, the Board held that the prop-
erty was not purchased for resale within the meaning of the statute. 7 
C. PERSONAL INCOME TAXES 
§11.20. Income from Out-Of-State Real Estate. In Ingraham v. 
State Tax Commission, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court resolved one of the 
most interesting questions raised by the 1971 amendments to the per-
sonal income tax. 2 The Court held that income derived from real es-
tate located outside the Commonwealth is subject to tax and that the 
income tax statute, chapter 62 of the General Laws, as amended in 
1971, is valid under the United States and Massachusetts Consti-
tutions.3 
Prior to the 1971 amendments to chapter 62, it was clear that the 
personal income tax imposed by that chapter was not a general in-
come tax.4 It did not generally apply to all forms of income, as such, 
2 !d. 
3 !d. 
4 !d. at 10,366-67. 
5 !d. 
6Jd. at 10,367. 
7 Id. at 10,366. See State Tax Commission, Sales & Use Tax Emergency Reg. No. 12, 
"Contractors and Subcontractors" (july 7, 1966). 
§11.20. 1 1975 Ma~. Adv. Sh. 2160,331 N.E.2d 795. 
2 G.L. c. 62, as amended by Acts of 197 I, c. 555. 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2167, 2170, 331 N.E.2d at 798, 799. 
4 !d. at 2162, 331 N.E.2d at 796, citing State Tax Comm'n v. Wheatland, 343 Mass. 
650, 653, 180 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1962). 
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regardless of their source. Instead, it applied only to certain limited 
types of income derived from specific sources. 5 On many occasions, 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that the tax was in reality not a tax 
on income as such at all, but a property tax imposed on certain classes 
of property and measured by the income derived therefrom. 6 
Although nothing in the United States Constitution prevents a state 
from imposing a general income tax on the income of residents, in-
cluding income derived from out-of-state real estate, 7 a state does lack 
power to impose a property tax on real property geographically lo-
cated outside its borders. 8 Sensitive to this constitutional prohibition, 
the Supreme Judicial Court consistently construed the tax imposed by 
chapter 62 in years prior to 1971 as inapplicable to income derived 
from out-of-state real estate. 9 Indeed, in 1969 in State Tax Commission 
v. Fine, 10 the Court said that in order to avoid raising doubts as to the 
constitutionality of the tax, an amendment to chapter 62 would not be 
construed as intended to reach income from out-of-state real estate 
absent a very clear expression of legislative intention to achieve that 
specific result. 11 
Under chapter 62, as amended by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, 
Massachusetts residents are now subject to personal income tax on 
their entire "gross income."12 
In Ingraham, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, by adopting the 
all-inclusive standards of federal gross income, the Legislature evi-
denced a clear intent to tax residents of the state on income from all 
sources, including rentals and other income from out-of-state real 
estate. 13 Moreover, the Court held that to construe the tax so as to 
achieve this result would not create any problem under the United 
States Constitution. 14 Since the "nature and effect" of the tax in 
Ingraham were those "of a tax on the income from property as distin-
guished from a tax on the property itself," the Court reasoned that 
the tax fell within the permissible limits of state taxing power as de-
5 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2162, 331 N.E.2d at 796. 
6 State Tax Comm'n v. Fine, 356 Mass. 51, 54-55, 247 N.E.2d 701, 704 (1969); State 
Tax Comm'n v. Wheatland, 343 Mass. 650, 653, 180 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1962); Riesman 
v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 326 Mass. 574, 577, 95 N.E.2d 656, 659 (1950); 
Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 624, 108 N.E. 570, 574 (1915). 
7 New Yorkexrel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308,314-15 (1937). 
8 Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 424 (l 935). 
9 E.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Fine, 356 Mass. 51, 59, 247 N.E.2d 701, 707 (1969). See 
Ingraham, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2162,331 N.E.2d at 796. 
10 356 Mass. 51, 59-60, 247 N.E.2d 701, 707 (1969). 
11 /d. at 59-60, 247 N.E.2d at 707. 
12 See G.L. c. 62, § 2. "Gross income" is defined by reference to its definition under 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, G.L. c. 62, § 2(a), and thus includes "all income 
from whatever.source derived." INT. REV. Com OF 1954, § 61(a). 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2163-64, 331 N.E.2d at 796. 
14 /d. at 2170, 331 N.E.2d at 799. 
29
Hines: Chapter 11: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
§11.20 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 231 
fined by the Supreme Court. 15 Finally, the Court held that under arti-
cle XLIV of the Articles of Amendment of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution, the Legislature had power to impose a general income tax 
and was not restricted to imposing a limited income tax of the prop-
erty type such as was in force prior to the 1971 amendments. 16 
To the disappointment of many, the Court left unresolved what was 
perhaps the most interesting issue in the case, the question of the 
exact source of the Legislature's power to impose a general income 
tax. Apparently, the Court felt that its holding as to the existence of 
the power was all that was needed in order to dispose of the case be~ 
fore it. In any event, the issue was left for another day. 
Prior to the adoption of article XLIV of the Articles of Amendment 
of the Massachusetts Constitution, the Legislature's sole source of 
power to impose taxes lay in article IV of section I of chapter I of 
part II of the Massachusetts Constitution, which provides, in part, 
that: 
full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said 
general court, from time to time ... to impose and levy propor-
tional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the 
inhabitants of, and persons resident, and estates lying, within the 
said commonwealth; and also to impose and levy, reasonable 
duties and excises, upon any produce, goods, wares, merchandise, 
and commodities, whatsoever, brought into, produced,· manufac-
tured, or being within the same; . . . · 
Under this provision, two kinds of taxes are authorized. The first 
clause (the "property tax clause") authorizes direct taxes oh persons 
and property provided such taxes are both reasonable and propor-
tional. The second clause (the "excise clause") authorizes excises on 
"produce, goods, wares, merchandise, and commodities." Unlike taxes 
on persons or property, excises need not be proportional, only 
reasonable. 
When the personal income tax. was first proposed in 1915, the Su-
preme Judicial Court, in response to an inquiry from the Legislature, 
opined that it would be a tax on property and that it would fail to 
satisfy the proportional requirement of the property tax dauseY To 
remedy this problem, article XLIV of the Articles of Amendments of 
the Massachusetts Constitution was adopted, providing i!S follows: 
Full power and authority are hereby given and grant~ to the 
general court to impose and levy a tax on income in the manner 
hereinafter provided. Such tax may be at different rates upon in-
15 Jd_., citing New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937). 
· 
16 1975 Mass Adv. Sh. at 2170, 331 N .E.2d at 799. 
17 Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 624, 108 N.E. 570, 574 (1915). 
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come derived from different classes of property, but shall be 
levied at a uniform rate throughout the commonwealth upon in-
comes derived from the same class of property. The general court 
may tax income not derived from property at a lower rate than 
income derived from property, and may grant reasonable exemp-
tions and abatements. Any class of property the income from 
which is taxed under the provisions of this artide may be exempt-
ed from the imposition and levying of proportional and reason-
able assessments, rates and taxes as at present authorized by the 
constitution. This article shall not be construed to limit the power 
o_f the general court to impose and levy reasonable duties and ex-
Cises. 
It was under the authority of the property tax clause and article 
XLIV jointly that the Legislature first enacted the personal income 
tax in chapter 62. 
In Ingraham, one of the taxpayer's principal arguments was that, de-
spite the 1971 amendments, the tax imposed by chapter 62 remained 
a property tax, which could not be imposed on income from out-of-
state real estate without violating the United States Constitution. This 
argument was based largely on the taxpayer's claim that the property 
tax clause was the only provision of the Massachusetts Constitution 
that authorized the imposition of a general income tax. 18 
The Appellate Tax Board, which decided the case adversely to the 
taxpayer in the first instance, 19 held that the 1971 amendments to 
chapter 62 converted the personal income tax from a property tax to 
"a general income tax of the excise type."20 In other words, the Board 
held that the tax as amended was an excise measured by income, 
which was authorized under the excise clause. 
Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the taxpayer argued that the 
Board's decision was insupportable. Under the excise clause, excises 
can be levied only on "produce, goods, wares, merchandise, and 
commodities."21 The taxpayer conceded that the term "commodities" 
had been expansively interpreted. He argued, however, that the term 
would have to be stretched to its breaking point to include income.22 
Moreover, the taxpayer, with some logic, pointed out that article 
XLIV would have been completely unnecessary if the power to im-
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2164-65, 331 N.E.2d at 797. 
19 The decision of the Appellate Tax Board was reported at 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., 
MASS. '200-400, at 10,317 (1974) and was discussed in Glazer & Bruskin, State & Local 
Taxation, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 15.14, at 337-39. 
20 /d. at 10,318. 
21 MASS. CONST. pt. II, c. I, § I, art. IV. 
22 But see Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 122, 38 N.E. 512, 515 (1894) upholding 
the inheritance tax imposed by G.L. c. 65 as an excise on a "commodity," the privilege 
of transmitting property on death. 
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pose excises included the power to tax incomes. 23 
Perhaps persuaded by the taxpayer's argument, the Attorney Gen-
eral declined to support the Board's view that the tax, as amended, 
could be upheld as an excise. Instead, he argued that the Board's de-
cision should be upheld on the basis of a novel, but intriguing theory 
first suggested by Robert McGee of Palmer & Dodge in an article that 
appeared in the Boston Bar Journal at about the same time the Ap-
pellate Tax Board's report in the case was issued.24 Under the prop-
erty tax clause, the Legislature has power to impose taxes not only on 
property, but also on "inhabitants" and "residents" of the 
Commonwealth.25 McGee suggested26 and the Attorney General ar-
gued that the personal income tax, as amended by chapter 555 of the 
Acts of 1971, should be upheld as a personal tax measured by 
income. 27 
The Attorney General also suggested, as an alternative, that the tax 
as amended by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, might be authorized 
by the terms of article XLIV itself, i.e., that the income tax amend-
ment might be viewed as a separate, third source of legislative taxing 
power independent of both the property tax clause and the excise 
clause. 28 This possibility was rejected by the taxpayer who claimed 
that article XLIV was adopted only to allow a property tax on income 
without regard to the proportionality requirement, not to authorize a 
general income tax of the kind imposed by chapter 555 of the Acts of 
1971.29 
The Supreme Judicial Court was able to avoid choosing among the 
four theories before it-property tax measured by income, personal 
tax measured by income, excise measured by income, or pure income 
23 The exact scope of the excise power has never been definitively settled. In 
Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass. 419 (1883), the Court ruled that the term "commodities" 
in the excise clause included privileges conferred by the Legislature, but did not extend 
to "natural rights at common law." Id. at 425. Subsequent cases have questioned this 
distinction and suggested that the result in McKay could be supported on other 
grounds. Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 603, 615-17, 85 N.E. 545, 549-50 (1908); 
Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 122, 38 N.E. 512, 515 (1894). The present status of 
the "natural rights" doctrine is somewhat unclear. See Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 
590, 595-96, 165 N.E. 904, 906 (1929). 
24 McGee, Massachusetts Taxation of Income From Foreign Real Estate, 18 BosTON BARJ., 
No. 4, at 7 (April 1974) [hereinafter cited as McGee]. 
25 MASS. CoNST. pt. II, c. I, § I, art. IV. 
26 McGee, sufrra note 24, at 11-12. 
27 Brief for Appellee at 17-22. 
28 Brief for Appellee at 20 n.10. This suggestion was not strongly pressed by the At-
torney General, suggesting some lack of confidence in it. In his article, McGee con-
cluded that the history of article XLIV indicated that it was intended only to loosen the 
restrictions on the property tax power so as to permit a limited income tax of the prop-
erty type, not to confer a new independent source of taxing power on the legislature. 
McGee, supra note 24, at 10. 
29 Brief for Appellant at 21. 
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tax authorized by article XLIV itself-only by rejecting the taxpayer's 
premise that the tax would be invalid under the United States Con-
stitution if imposed under the authority of the property tax clause.30 
The Court held that the character of the tax for state law purposes 
was irrelevant in determining its constitutionality for federal 
purposes. 31 Under applicable federal principles, the Court said, the 
nature and effect of the personal income tax, as amended by chapter 
555 of the Acts of 1971, would be viewed as that of general income 
tax rather than a tax on property.32 
Although the concern of the parties as to the exact source of the 
Legislature's power to impose a general income tax may seem some-
what academic, very real and very practical consequences were at 
stake. Until the appearance of McGee's article suggesting two new 
possible bases for supporting the tax,33 there appeared to be only two 
real possibilities-either the tax was a property tax or it was an excise. 
If the former, there was the question whether it could be applied to 
income from out-of-state real estate without offending the United 
States Constitution. If the tax, as amended, was an excise, on the 
other hand, it would not be subject to either the proportionality re-
quirement of the property tax clause34 or the requirement of article 
XLIV that income taxes imposed thereunder be levied at a uniform 
rate throughout the Commonwealth on income derived from the 
same source.35 Under these circumstances, it would be possible to 
further amend the tax to introduce graduated rates without a constitu-
tional amendment. In 1972, a graduated income tax amendment was on 
the ballot. After an intense and sometimes bitter political battle, the 
measure was defeated. In light of this history, it was generally felt that 
the Court would be very reluctant to hand down a decision allowing 
the enactment of a graduated income tax without a constitutional 
amendment. 
Although the Court was able to avoid this difficult issue in the 
Ingraham case, the issue has not gone away. Indeed, in light of the 
state's current financial problems, it is likely that pressure for a 
graduated income tax will continue to mount. Sooner or later, the 
Legislature will undoubt€dly request the opinion of the Justices as to 
the possibility of enacting a graduated income tax without a constitu-
tional amendment on the basis of the excise clause. When this occurs, 
the question left unresolved in Ingraham will finally receive an answer. 
30 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2169, 331 N.E.2d at 798. 
3t I d. 
32 /d. at 2170,331 N.E.2d at 798-99. 
33 McGee, supra note 24, at 10-14. 
34 MASS. CONST. pt. II, c. I, § I, art. IV. 
35 MASS. CoNST. amend. art. XLIV. 
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§11.21. Chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971: Deductions Against In-
come Taxable At the Rate of 9 Percent. Although Wheatland v. 
Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation 1 was essentially a companion 
case to Ingraham, 2 it did involve an additional issue relating to the de-
ductibility of certain expenses. The taxpayer's income from out-of-
state real estate during 1971 consisted primarily of gain from the sale 
of standing timber located in Maine. On its 1971 federal return, the 
taxpayer claimed as miscellaneous itemized deductions certain ex-
penses incurred in connection with the timber land. 3 When the Com-
missioner of Corporations and Taxation assessed a tax on the gain 
from the sale of the timber at the rate of 9 percent under section 
4(a)(3) of chapter 62 of the General Laws, as amended by chapter 555 
of the Acts of 1971, he refused to allow the amount of the gain to be 
reduced by the amount of these expenses. 4 The taxpayer argued that 
the Commissioner's failure to take the expenses into account was 
improper.5 
Under the 1971 amendments to chapter 62, there was considerable 
uncertainty as to the proper treatment of allowable deductions ( 1) 
where the amount of such deductions exceeded the amount of income 
taxable at the rate of 5 percent ("5 percent income"); and (2) where 
such deductions, although not in excess of the 5 percent income, were 
directly attributable to income taxable at the rate of 9 percent ("9 per-
cent income"). 
Sections 2 and 3 of chapter 62, as amended by chapter 555 of the 
Acts of 1971, defined "income subject to taxation" as federal gross in-
come less certain of the deductions allowable under sections 62 and 
404 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (hereinafter "Code deduc-
tions") with a number of further adjustments not here relevant. Sec-
tions 4(a) and (b) of chapter 62, as so amended, then provided for 
"income subject to taxation" to be separated into two classes, one sub-
ject to tax at the rate of 9 percent and the other subject to tax at the 
rate of 5 percent. The language of sections 4(a) and (b) was as follows: 
(a) The amount by which the following classes of income 
included in income subject to taxation ... exceeds the exemption al-
lowable by section five B(b) shall be taxed at the rate of nine per-
cent: 
( 1 )(i) Interest .. . 
(ii) Dividends .. . 
(3) The net capital gain .... 
(b) The amount by which the income subject to taxation, other than 
§11.21. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2171,331 N.E.2d 799. 
2 Ingraham v. State Tax Comm'n, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2160, 331 N.E.2d 795. 
3 /d. at 2172,331 N.E.2d at 800. 
4 See id. 
5 /d. at 2173, 331 N.E.2d at 800. 
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the income taxable under subsection (a) ... exceeds the exemp-
tions allowable under section five B(a) shall be taxed at the rate of 
five percent. 6 
The statute offered no guidance as to how Code deductions were to 
be apportioned when "income subject to taxation" was divided into 
these two classes. 
The Department of Corporations and Taxation early took the posi-
tion that Code deductions were allowable only against 5 percent in-
come, even though they might be directly attributable to 9 percent in-
come. Moreover, the Department took the position that Code deduc-
tions were allowable only to the extent of 5 percent income. 7 Thus, under 
the Department's view, a taxpayer who had $1000 of 9 percent in-
come, $1000 of 5 percent income and $2000 of Code deductions 
would incur a $90 tax (9 percent of $1 000) even though he had no in-
come subject to taxation. 
The position of the Department received its first test in Barnes v. 
State Tax Commission. 8 The Department had attempted to tax the gross 
interest income of an unincorporated small loan company at the rate 
of 9 percent without any allowance for the expenses, other than 
interest, 9 that the taxpayer incurred to produce the income. The Su-
preme Judicial Court, in a suit for declaratory judgment, held that the 
expenses were improperly disallowed. 10 The Court held that the tax 
was a tax on net income, i.e., gross income less the costs and expenses 
of producing the income.U Moreover, the Court held that the amount 
of income taxable at the rate of 9 percent could not exceed the total 
"income subject to taxation."12 
Although Barnes clearly rejected the Department's view that Code 
deductions were never deductible against 9 percent income, there was 
some uncertainty as to the exact scope of its application. Some, includ-
ing apparently the Department, viewed the case as limited to the busi-
ness context. Under this view, the case meant only that business ex-
penses incurred in the conduct of an active trade or business that 
generated 9 percent income had to be allowed to offset the amount of 
such income taxable at the rate of 9 percent. Others viewed the case 
as only applying in situ'ations where the amount of the Code deduc-
tions exceeded the amount of income taxable at the rate of 5 percent. 
Under these circumstances, unless the excess deductions were allow-
6 Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 4 (emphasis added). 
7 See Barnes v. State Tax Comm'n, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 763, 765, 331 N.E.2d 510, 
511-12. 
8 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 763, 331 N.E.2d 510. 
9 The statute specifically authorized a deduction against 9 percent income for certain 
types of interest expense. See G.L. c. 62, § 4(c), as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 5. 
10 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 768, 331 N.E.2d at 513. 
II Jd. 
12 I d. 
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able against 9 percent income, the amount of income taxable at the 
rate of 9 percent would exceed the total "income subject to taxation." 
Finally, still others read the case as allowing Code deductions against 
9 percent income not only in these two situations, but also whenever 
the deductions were directly attributable to items of income taxable at 
the rate of 9 percent. Under this view, for example, the only interest 
income included in "income subject to taxation" within the meaning 
of section 4(a)(l) of chapter 62 of the General Laws, as amended by 
chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, was interest income net of the Code 
deductions incurred to produce it. 
In the Wheatland case, the Attorney General on brief conceded, 13 
and the Court clearly implied, that the latter interpretation of the 
Barnes case was the correct one. 14 The language of the Court was as 
follows: 
In this case a further argument is made that if the income from 
the sale of timber on property in Maine is subject to taxation then 
deductions must be allowed for the expenses of earning the in-
come and maintaining the property. It appears that the Commis-
sioner does not dispute this as a general proposition. Income 
"subject to taxation" under c.62 is based on adjusted gross income 
as defined in §2(b) of c.62, and consequently permits "the deduc-
tions allowed under sectio[n] sixty-two ... of the [Internal 
Revenue] Code." Among the deductions allowed by §62 of the 
Code are ordinary and necessary business expenses (26 U.S.C. 
§ 162 [ 1970]) and expenses for the production of income (26 
u.s.c. §212 [1970])." 15 
Having stated the general rule, however, the Court left it to the par-
ties to agree upon the specific items that qualified for deduction. 16 
13 The Attorney General said: "Hence, the 1971 Act provides that the taxable capital 
gain of§ 4(a)(3) be arrived at by deducting expenses allowable under § 162 and § 212 
of the Code." Brief for Appellee at 23. 
14 The statement of facts on pages 4-5 of the Appellee's Brief indicated that the tax-
payer was not actively engaged in the conduct of a trade or business and that the tax-
payer did have income taxable at the rate of 5 percent during the year in question. 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2173-74, 331 N.E.2d at 800. The Court's statement that 
deductions allowable under § 212 of the Code are taken into account in determining a 
taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income under § 62 of the Code requires qualification. 
INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 62(5) allows there to be taken into account, in determining 
federal adjusted gross income, only those § 212 expenses "which are attributable to 
property held for the production of rents or royalties." 
16 /d. at 2174, 331 N.E.2d at 801. The Court may have been reluctant to pass on the 
deductibility of the specific items of expense involved because of uncertainty as to their 
status under § 62 of the Code. The taxpayer conceded that the expenses in question 
were in fact claimed as miscellaneous itemized deductions on its 1971 federal income 
tax return. Brief for Appellant at 24. Neither party, however, briefed the question 
whether the expenses could have been claimed as adjustments to gross income under § 62 
of the Code for federal income tax purposes. 
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It should be noted that most of the problems under the 1971 
amendments to chapter 62 relating to the allowability of deductions 
against 9 percent income were eliminated by chapter 723 of the Acts 
of 1973,17 Under that statute, Massachusetts gross income, which is 
defined by reference to federal gross income subject to certain 
adjustments, 18 is first divided into "Part A" gross income (interest, di-
vidends, and capital gain) and "Part B" gross income (all other Mass-
achusetts gross income). 19 Part B adjusted gross income is then de-
fined as the Part B gross income less certain of the deductions allow-
able under sections 62 and 404 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954.20 Part A adjusted gross income is defined as the Part A gross 
income less certain deductions, among them the excess of the allow-
able Code deductions over Part B gross income. 21 The statute does 
provide, however, that excess Code deductions can only offset so 
much of the Part A gross income as is effectively connected with the 
active conduct of a trade or business.22 
§11.22. Chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971: Trusts With Transfer-
able Shares. Prior to chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, trusts with 
transferable shares (hereinafter "corporate trusts") were not subject to 
tax under chapter 62 unless (1) they fell into one of the three 
categories described in then section l(c) of chapter 62, and (2) they 
elected to file an agreement to pay the tax then imposed by chapter 
62. 1 If a corporate trust did elect to file such an agreement, dividends 
on its shares were exempt from tax under chapter 62.2 If no agree-
ment was filed, however, dividends on shares of the corporate trust 
were taxed at the rate of 8 percent in the same manner as corporate 
dividends. 3 
Although the 1971 amendments to chapter 62 extensively revised 
this system of taxing corporate trusts and their shareholders, it clearly 
remained the intent of the Legislature that income earned by corpo-
rate trusts would be taxed only once, either at the trust level or at the 
shareholder level, but not at both. Under sections B(a) and (b) of 
chapter 62, as added by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, all corporate 
trusts engaged in business in the Commonwealth became subject to 
tax unless ( 1) they qualified as regulated investment companies or real 
17 See generally McGee & Page, Massachusetts Income Tax-1973 Revisions, 17 BOSTON 
BARj., No. 12, at 5-16 (Dec. 1973). 
18 G.L. c. 62, § 2(a), as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2. 
19 I d. § 2(b), as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2. 
20 Id. § 2(d), as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2. 
21 /d. § 2(c), as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 723. 
22 I d. 
§11.22. 1 See G.L. c. 62, §§ 1(c), 1(d), 1(e) and 5(d), as in effect prior to Acts of 1971, 
c. 555. 
2 G.L. c. 62, § 1(c) & (e), as in effect prior to Acts of 1971, c. 555. 
3 I d. 
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estate investment trusts under sections 851 or 856, respectively, of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954; (2) they qualified as a "holding com-
pany," as defined in chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971; or (3) they de-
rived less than 10 percent of their income from within the Common-
wealth. Under section 8(c) of chapter 62, as added by chapter 555 of 
the Acts of 1971, dividends on shares of corporate trusts were exempt 
from tax except in two situations. The first was where the corporate 
trust was itself exempt from tax. The second was where the dividend 
was paid out of "tax-free earnings and profits." The term "tax-free 
earnings and profits" was defined for this purpose as any earnings 
and profits accumulated prior to January 1, 1971, during a period 
when the corporate trust was not subject to tax under chapter 62 sole-
ly because it had not elected to file the agreement to pay the tax. 4 
Cacciatore v. State Tax Commission 5 involved a corporate trust that 
had never filed the agreement to pay the tax. In 1966, the trust made 
an installment sale of Massachusetts real estate and, for federal in-
come tax purposes, elected to report the gain on the installment 
method. 6 On its 1971 federal income tax return, the trust reported a 
gain of $70,043 as a result of payments received during the year on 
account of the sale. The Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation 
took the position that the gain should have been reported on the 
trust's 1971 Massachusetts return as well because, under chapter 555 
of the Acts of 1971, the trust's Massachusetts gross income was de-
termined by reference to its federal gross income. 7 The taxpayer dis-
agreed, arguing that its entire profit on the sale constituted "tax-free 
earnings and profits."8 If the gain did constitute "tax-free earnings 
and profits," of course, it would be taxable to the shareholders when 
distributed and thus could not be taxed to the trust without imposing 
what would amount to a double tax. 
The Appellate Tax Board decided the case against the taxpayer, 
apparently on the grounds that the accrued profit on the sale was not 
"accumulated" prior to 1971.9 Before the Supreme Judicial Court, 
however, the Attorney General did not defend the Board's decision 
on this basis -in effect, according to the Court, conceding that it was 
wrong. 10 Instead, the Attorney General argued that the profit could 
4 Id. § 8(c), as added by Acrs of 1971, c. 555, § 5. 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2010, 330 N.E.2d 850. 
6 /d. at 2011, 330 N.E.2d at 850-51. See INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954 § 453. 
7 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2011, 330 N .E.2d at 851. See G.L. c. 62, § 2, as added by Acts 
of 1971, c. 555. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2011, 330 N.E.2d at 851. 
9 See id. at 2012, 330 N.E.2d at 851. As noted, G.L. c. 62, § 2, as added by Acts of 
1971, c. 555, defined "tax-free earnings and profits" as any earnings and profits "ac-
cumulated" prior to January I, 1971, during a period when the trust was not subject to 
tax under G.L. c. 62 solely because it had elected not to file the agreement to pay the 
tax. 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2012, 330 N.E.2d at 851. 
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not be considered as included in "tax-free earnings and profits" be-
cause it was not shown "by the books" of the trustY The Court held 
that this issue could not be considered because there was no indication 
that it was raised before the Board. 12 Accordingly, the Court reversed 
the Board and held for the taxpayer, apparently on the basis of the 
Attorney General's concession. 13 
In addition to the Cacciatore case, there were also two decisions of 
the Appellate Tax Board during the 197 5 Survey year that were con-
cerned with corporate trusts. The last sentence of section 8(a) of chap-
ter 62, as added by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, provided that: 
"In determining the Code deductions allowable to such ... 
[corporate] trust under this chapter it shall be considered to be an in-
dividual and not a corporation." The two decisions of the Board were 
concerned with the effect of this language. 
Forte Investment Fund v. State Tax Commission 14 involved a corporate 
trust that was classified as an association taxable as a corporation for 
federal income tax purposes. 15 During 1971, the trust's gross income 
consisted exclusively of interest, dividends, and net capital gain, and 
its expenses consisted largely of fees paid for investment advice. The 
case ccncerned the propriety of the Commission's refusal to allow any 
deduction for the trust's expenses in determining its income subject to 
taxation under chapter 62. 16 
As amended by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971, sections 2 and 3 of 
chapter 62 permitted deductions to be taken into account in determin-
ing Massachusetts income subject to taxation only if they were allowed 
under sections 62 or 404 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the 
"Code") in determining the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income. 
Referring to the language in .section 8(a) of chapter 62, quoted above, 
the Board held that the expenses were properly disallowed. The 
Board observed that if the taxpayer were treated as an individual 
rather than a corporation for federal income tax purposes, the ex-
penses in question ·would not have been allowed in determining its 
11 /d. G.L. c. 62, § 8(c), as added by Acts of 1971, c. 555, provided that, notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, dividends from the tax-free earnings and profits of a 
corporate trust would be subject to tax. G.L. c. 62, § 1(£), as added by Acts of 1971, c. 
555, defined the term "dividend" as a distribution out of current or accumulated earn-
ings and profits, and went on to provide that: "Earnings and profits, as used herein, 
means the earnings and profits shown by the books of the ... entity making the distribu-
tion." (Emphasis added). 
12 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2013, 330 N.E.2d at 851. 
13 See id. at 2014, 330 N.E.2d at 851. Although the Court accepted the Attorney 
General's concession for the purposes of the case before it, it made it quite clear that it 
was not passing upon the propriety of the concession. /d. at 2012-13, 330 N.E.2d at 
851. 
14 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. '200-427, at 10,347 (1975). 
15 See INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § .7701(3) and the Treasury Department regulations 
promulgated thereunder. 
16 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. ,200-427, at 10,348 (1975). 
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federal adjusted gross income because they were not incurred m a 
trade or business. 17 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is difficult to quarrel with 
the Board's decision in Forte Investment Fund. Indeed, the language in 
section 8(a) of chapter 62, quoted above, seems to have been drawn to 
accomplish precisely the result reached by the Board. The same can-
not be said, however, of the Board's decision in the second case in-
volving the effect of this language. 
B.W. Company v. State Tax Commission 18 involved another corporate 
trust that was taxed as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. 
The case concerned the propriety of a tax assessed against the trust 
on a gain from the sale of certain real estate. The real estate was sold 
by the trust on April 30, 1971, pursuant to a plan of complete liquida-
tion that was adopted by the shareholders of the trust on April 28, 
1971. The gain was not recognized for federal income tax purposes 
because of the application of section 337 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954.19 
The trust argued that the tax was improper because under chapter 
62, as amended by chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971 its income subject 
to taxation was based on its federal gross income and the gain in 
question was excluded from federal gross income under section 337 
of the Code. The trust argued that section 8(a) only required corpo-
rate trusts to be treated as individuals for purposes of determining 
their allowable deductions under the Code, not for purposes of de-
termining their federal gross income. Moreover, the trust argued that 
it would be an unconstitutional denial of due process to apply the 
provisions of chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971 to the transaction be-
cause the sale was fully consummated almost three months prior to 
the date when that statute was signed into law and almost two months 
prior to the time when the legislation was first proposed. The tax-
payer argued that had it known of the new law, it would have taken 
steps to avoid its application.20 As an example, the taxpayer suggested 
that it might have transferred the real estate to a corporation under 
section 351 of the Code in order to effect the liquidation without 
taxation.21 
The Appellate Tax Board rejected the trust's arguments and held 
the gain subject to taxation. 22 Referring to the language of section 
8(a), quoted above, the Board held that it was indicative of the 
Legislature's intent that corporate trusts be taxed as individuals not as 
17 Id. at 10,348-49. 
18 I d. 11200-431, at 10,355 ( 1975). 
19 !d. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337. 
2o 2 CCH STATE TAX REP .. MASS. '11200-431, at 10,356-57. 
21 /d. at 10,3.57. 
22 /d. at 10,358. 
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corporations. 23 Because the nonrecognition provisions of Section 337 
of the Code are only available to corporations under the Code, the 
Board concluded that the Legislature did not intend that corporate 
trusts would be able to invoke their protection.24 Furthermore, the 
Board held that the taxpayer's due process argument was without 
merit. Citing Gregory v. Helvering, 25 the Board said it was not per-
suaded that the taxpayer could have avoided the tax simply by trans-
ferring the real estate to a corporation for purposes of the 
liquidation. 26 
Some of the ambiguities regarding the treatment of corporate trusts 
have since been corrected. Chapter 723 of the Acts of 1973 rewrote 
section 8(a), deleting the language quoted above and inserting in its 
place the following: 
The Massachusetts adjusted gross income of such corporate trust 
shall be redetermined as if it were a resident natural person, pro-
vided, however, that for purposes of any determination involving 
sections three hundred and fifty-one through three hundred and 
sixty-eight of the Code any corporate trust shall be treated as a 
corporation. No deductions or exemptions allowable under sec-
tions three A or three B of this chapter shall be allowed to a cor-
porate trust. 
Under section 8(a) as so amended, therefore, it is clear that corporate 
trusts will not be able to avail themselves of the nonrecognition provi-
sions of section 337 of the Code for Massachusetts income tax pur-
poses. 
§11.23, Fiduciaries: Income Accumulated for Nonresidents. 
Section IO(a) of chapter 62 of the General Laws provides that income of 
trusts described in subsection (c) of that section is subject to tax under 
chapter 62 to the extent it is paid to or accumulated for residents of the 
Commonwealth. No tax is imposed to the extent such income is paid to or 
accumulated for nonresidents. 1 In determining whether income is ac-
cumulated for residents or nonresidents, certain operating rules are 
provided. Income accumulated for unborn or unascertained persons or 
persons with uncertain interests is to be considered income accumulated 
for residents of the Commonwealth. 2 Moreover, the statute provides that 
income is to be deemed accumulated for unborn or unascertained per-
sons or persons with uncertain interests if it is accumulated for the benefit 
23 /d. 
24 /d. 
25 293 u.s. 465 (1935). 
26 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. 11200-431, at 10,357. 
§11.23. 1 G.L. c. 62, § 10(a). 
2 /d. 
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of "any future interest other than a remainder presently vested in a 
person or persons in being not subject to be divested by the happening of 
any contingency expressly mentioned in the instrument creating the 
trust."3 
In 1966, in State Tax Commission v. Loring, 4 the Supreme Judicial 
Court took a certain amount of liberty with this statutory language in 
order to exempt from tax trust income accumulated for a minor re-
siding in California. The trust in question had been drawn to comply 
with the provisions of section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954,5 so as to allow the $3000 annual gift tax exclusion to be 
available with respect to contributions made to it on the minor's be-
half. The terms of the trust provided that, during the beneficiary's 
minority, the trustee had discretion to apply principal and income for 
her benefit. Any income not so expended was to be accumulated. 
Upon the beneficiary's attaining the age of twenty-one, the trust 
property then remaining was to be paid to her outright. If the bene-
ficiary died prior to attaining the age of twenty-one, the trust prop-
erty remaining at her death was to be distributed as she appointed by 
will and, in default of appointment, it was to be paid to her estate.6 
The Commission conceded that the minor had a presently vested 
remainder interest in the trust. Nonetheless, it argued that the re-
mainder interest was "subject to be[ing] divested by the happening of 
. . . [a] contingency expressly mentioned in the instrument creating 
the trust."7 The Commission pointed out that, as a technical property 
law matter, the minor's remainder interest would be divested if she 
died prior to attaining the age of twenty-one after having executed a 
will exercising her testamentary power of appointment. 8 The Su-
preme Judicial Court, however, sided with the taxpayer, holding that 
the accumulated income did not become taxable merely because of 
the existence of the testamentary power. 9 The Court noted that the 
3 Id. 
4 350 Mass. 568, 215 N.E.2d 751 (1966). 
5 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2503(c) provides as follows: 
No part of a gift to an individual who has not attained the age of 21 years on 
the date of such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property 
for purposes of subsection (b) if the property and the income therefrom-
(!) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee before his attaining 
the age of 21 years, and 
(2) will to the extent not so expended-
(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years, and 
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21 years, be pay-
able to the estate of the donee or as he may appoint under a general 
power of appointment as defined in section 2514(c). 
6 350 Mass. at 568-69, 215 N.E.2d at 752. 
7 Brief for Appellant at 5. 
8 !d. 
9 350 Mass. at 572, 215 N.E.2d at 755. 
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power was presumably created in order to satisfy the requirements of 
section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, not to render 
the beneficiary's remainder interest uncertain. 10 Moreover, the Court 
observed that, in fact, the existence of the power tended to augment, 
rather than cut down, the minor's interest in the trust.U In sum, the. 
Court held that exercise of the testamentary power there involved was 
not the type of divestment possibility that the Legislature had in 
mind. 12 
During the 1975 Survey year, the Appellate Tax Board was called 
upon to decide a case that was similar in many respects to Loring. DeRham 
v. State Tax Commission 13 involved a trust for the benefit of another minor 
residing in California. The terms of the trust were virtually identical to 
those of the trust in Loring, with one important exception. The trust in 
Loring provided that if the minor died before attaining the age of twenty-
one, any trust property remaining. would be paid to her estate unless she 
exercised her testamentary power of appointment. 14 The trust in deRahm 
provided that if the minor died before attaining the age of twenty-one 
without exercising his testamentary power, the trust property would be 
paid to his then living issue or, if none, to the then living issue of his father 
and mother or, if none, to his heirs at law. 15 Nevertheless, following 
LOring, the Board held for the taxpayer. 16 
The development from Loring to deRham is interesting. The tes-
tamentary power of appointment, which was the sword of the Com-
mission in Loring) became the shield of the taxpayer in deRham. In 
Loring, the Commission argued that the accumulated income was tax-
able because the minor's remainder interest would be divested if she 
died prior to attaining the age of twenty-one after having exercised 
the power. 17 fbe Court disagreed, observing that the minor's interest ~ 
was not cut down, but, if anything, augmented as a result of the exis-
tence of the power. 18 In deRham, the Commission argued that the ac-
cumulated income was taxable because the minor's remainder interest 
would be divested if· he died prior to attaining the age of twenty-one, 
without regard to whether or not he exercised his testarpentary 
power. The Board held that the possibility of divestment as a resu~t of 
failure to survive to twenty-one was cured by the existence of the tes~ 
tamentary power, which the Board said gave the minor most of the 
10 Id. at 570-71, 215 N.E.2d at 753-54. 
11 Id. at 571-72, 215 N.E.2d at 754. 
12 See id. at 572, 215 N.E.2d at 755. 
13 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. f200-425, at 10,342 (1975). 
14 350 Mass. at 568-69, 215 N.E.2d at 752. 
15 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. ,200-425, at 10,342. 
18 ld. at 10,344. 
17 350 Mass. at 572, 215 N.E.2d at 754. 
18 Id. at 572; 215 N.E.2d at 755. 
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incidents of ownership. 19 One is reminded of the adage about letting 
the camel's nose under the tent flap. 
§ 11.24. Appeal from Denial of Abatement Application: Time 
Requirements. Section 45 of chapter 62 of the General Laws pro-
vides that any person aggrieved by the refusal of the State Tax Com-
mission to abate a tax assessed under that chapter may appeal to the 
Appellate Tax Board within thirty days after the mailing of notice of 
the Commission's decision or within six months after the abatement 
application is deemed denied under section 6 of chapter 58A of the 
General Laws. In Falk v. State Tax Commission, 1 the Commission's 
notice of disallowance of the abatement application was mailed on 
July 15, 197 4 and received by the taxpayer on July 17, 197 4. The 
taxpayer filed a petition in the Appellate Tax Board on August 15, 
1974.2 The Board granted the Commission's plea in bar, holding that 
the petition was filed one day too late: 3 "Where a remedy has been 
created by a statute, which prescribes the time within which the rem-
edy must be pursued, the court has no jurisdiction to entertain pro-
ceedings begun at a later time."4 
§ 11.25. Administrative Rulings Relating To ERISA. Although 
chapter 62 of the General Laws defines many terms by reference to 
their definition under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the 
"Code"), the reference is to the Code as amended on January 1, 1971, 
not the Code as amended from time to time. 1 This incorporation of a 
dated version of the Code proved particularly troublesome in connec-
tion with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
("ERISA").2 During the Survey year, several important rulings and re-
leases were issued by the Department of Corporations and Taxation 
relating to this problem. 
In letters dated December 27, 1974, and January 23, 1975, ad-
dressed to Charles Jackson, Jr., of Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, then 
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation Nicholas L. Metaxas 
ruled that H.R. 10-or Keogh-Plans established in light of, or 
amended to conform with, ERISA, would not be considered disqual-
ified for Massachusetts purposes merely because of a technical failure 
to comply with the terms of the 1971 Code. The letters did provide, 
however, that for Massachusetts purposes, the deduction for H.R. 10 
19 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. ,200-425, at 10,344. 
§11.24. 1 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. t200-408, at 10,325 (1974). 
2 Id. at 10,326. 
3 I d. 
4 I d. 
§11.25. 1 See G.L. c. 62, § l(c), as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 723. 
2 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (Sept. 2, 1974). 
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contributions would remain at the lesser of $2,500 or 10 percent of 
earned income.3 
Technical Information Release 1975-1 ("T.I.R. 1975-1"), issued Au-
gust 1, 1975, dealt with Individual Retirement Accounts ("I.R.A.'s").4 
The release provides that no deduction for contributions to an I.R.A. 
will be allowed under chapter 62. Amounts withdrawn from an 
I.R.A., even though included in federal gross income, will be ex-
cluded in determining Massachusetts gross income to the extent pre-
viously subjected to tax. Where the I.R.A. constitutes a "true trust," 
the trustees will be subject to tax on income earned on the account 
under section 10 of chapter 62. Where the I.R.A. is in the nature of a 
custodial account, on the other hand, income earned on the account 
will be taxed directly to the depositor. 
T.I.R. 1975-1 also dealt with tax-free rollovers permitted under 
ERISA. The release provides that qualifying rollovers will be accorded 
nonrecognition treatment for Massachusetts purposes to the same ex-
tent as under the Code, as amended by ERISA, except where the roll-
over is to or through an I.R.A. In the latter situation, nonrecognition 
treatment will be denied for Massachusetts purposes and the indi-
vidual will be taxed under chapter 62 on the amount rolled over. 
D. CoRPORATE ExciSE TAXES 
§11.26. Security Corporations. In Industrial Finance Corp. v. State 
Tax Commission, 1 the issue was whether the taxpayer qualified as a 
domestic securities corporation under section 38B of chapter 63 of the 
General Laws, so as to be eligible for the favorable tax treatment al-
lowed such corporations under that section. The taxpayer was in the ~ 
business of making secured and unsecured loans for business and 
personal purposes. The loans, which ranged from $2,000 to over 
$1,000,000, were represented by promissory notes. The collateral for 
the secured notes consisted of chattel and real estate mortgages, as-
signment of accounts, pledges of stock, etc. 2 The taxpayer contended 
that the promissory notes were "securities" within the meaning of sec-
tion 38B and that, accordingly, it satisfied the requirement of the 
statute that it be "engaged exclusively in buying, selling, dealing in, or 
holding securities on its own behalf and not as a broker."3 
3 Copies of the Metaxas ruling letters are on file at the offices of the Boston College 
Industrial & Commercial Law Review, Boston College Law School, Newton Centre, 
Massachusetts. 
4 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 219, 408, as added by Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002, 88 
Stat. 829 (Sept. 2, 1974). 
§11.26. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 967, 326 N.E.2d 1. 
2 Id. at 968, 326 N.E.2d at 2. 
3 See id. at 970, 326 N.E.2d at 3. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate 
Tax Board in favor of the Commission. 4 The Court declined the 
taxpayer's invitation to decide the case on the narrow basis of whether 
or not the promissory notes constituted "securities" within the mean-
ing of the statute.5 Instead, the Court looked to the legislative history 
of the statute6 and concluded that it was intended to benefit only cor-
porations acquiring securities for investment, not corporations, such as 
the taxpayer, actively engaged in the business of lending money. 7 
A little over a month after the Court handed down its decision in 
Industrial Finance Corp., the Appellate Tax Board released its report in 
PoGM. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 8 which also involved the 
taxpayer's eligibility for classification as a domestic securities corpora-
tion under section 38B. The taxpayer, until 1967, was actively en-
gaged in business as a food manufacturer. In July, 1967, the taxpayer 
ceased manufacturing operations and sold all of its operating assets. 
Because of some zoning problems, it was unable to negotiate a cash 
sale of its real estate and it was forced to accept a $59,000 promissory 
note as part of the sale price. The note, which was secured by the real 
estate, was payable in installments over a fifteen year period and car-
ried 7 percent interest on the unpaid balance. 9 During the taxable 
year in question, the taxpayer received principal and interest pay-
ments on the installment note. The State Tax Commission took the 
position that the taxpayer's holding of the note and collecting princi-
pal and interest payments on it precluded it from securities corpora-
tion treatment because it was not engaged "exclusively" in securities 
transactions. 10 The Board disagreed and held for the taxpayerY The 
Board relied entirely on the reasoning of a 1968 Appellate Tax Board 
decision, Arcade Malleable Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 12 in reaching 
its decision: 
The board finds that the appellant intended to terminate its busi-
ness of manufacturing and to do business as a security corpora-
4 !d. at 971, 326 N.E.2d at 3. The Board's decision was reported at 2 CCH STATE TAx 
REP., MAss. 11200-389, at 10,300 (1974). For a discussion of the Board's decision, see 
Glazer & Bruskin, State & Local Taxation, 1974 ANN. SuRV. MASS. LAW§ 15.18, at 341-43. 
5 I d. at 977, 326 N.E.2d at 5. Although the Court did not reach the question whether 
the promissory notes held by the taxpayer were "securities" for purposes of G.L. c. 63, 
§ 38B, it suggested that the term "securities" might encompass promissory notes "when 
held for investment by a company whose business is investment." !d. 
6 See id. at 972-77, 326 N .E.2d at 4-5. 
7 Id. at 977, 326 N.E.2d at 5. 
8 2 CCH STATE TAx REP., MASS. •200-426, at 10,344 (1975). Although PoGM Co. was 
decided on June 14, 1974, the Board did not release its findings of fact and report 
until May 12, 1975. 
9 !d. at 10,345. 
10 !d. at 10,346. 
11 !d. 
12 2 CCH STATE TAx REP., MAss. 11200-274, at 10,072 (1968). 
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tion in the year 1963; that the appellant in good faith took all 
reasonable action to achieve this goal; that the holding of the title 
of the real estate was due to circumstances beyond the appellant's 
control. Insofar as it is a question of fact the board finds that the 
appellant did business in 1963 exclusively as a security corpora-
tion and that the real estate was held for the purpose of doing 
business but with the intention of selling it in liquidation of the 
former business. 13 
§11.27. Apportionment Percentage: Sales Factor. Joseph Pollack 
Corp. v. State Tax Commission 1 was a decision of the Appellate Tax 
Board involving the question whether certain of the taxpayer's sales 
were properly includible in the numerator of the sales factor of its 
apportionment percentage. Section 38(c) of chapter 63 of the General 
Laws provides that if a corporation has income taxable both within 
and without the Commonwealth, its taxable net income will be appor-
tioned to the Commonwealth by multiplying it by the corporation's 
apportionment percentage. During the taxable years involved in the 
case ( 1966 through 1969), the apportionment percentage was actually 
defined as a fraction, the numerator of which was the sum of the 
property factor, the payroll factor, and the sales factor, and the de-
nominator of which was three. 2 
Mass Mass Mass 
Apportionment Property + Payroll + Sales 
Percentage Total Total Total 
Property Payroll Sales 
3 
Under section 38(f) of chapter 63, the sales factor is a fraction, the 
numerator of which is the total sales of the corporation in the Com-
monwealth during the taxable year and the denominator of which is 
the total sales of the corporation everywhere during the taxable year. 
During the four taxable years involved, section 38(f) provided that 
sales of tangible personal property were Massachusetts sales includible 
in the numerator of the sales factor if 
... the property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, fac-
tory or other place of storage in this commonwealth and the cor-
poration is not taxable in the state of the purchaser and the prop-
erty was sold by an agent or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with or 
13 /d. at 10,073. See PoGM Co., 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS .• 200-426, at 10,346. 
§11.27. 1 2 CCH ST.ATE TAx REP., MAss. '200-411, at 10,327 (1974). 
2 G.L. c. 63, §§ 38(d), 38(c), 38(£). 
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sent out from premises for the transaction of business owned or rented by 
the corporation within this commonwealth. . .. 3 
In]oseph Pollak Corp., it was conceded that the property involved in 
the sales in question was shipped from Massachuesetts into a state 
where the taxpayer was not taxable. Thus, the issue was whether or 
not the property was sold by agents "chiefly situated at, connected 
with or sent out from" the taxpayer's Massachusetts office.4 
The evidence introduced at the hearing before the Board showed 
that the property involved was sold by independent manufacturer's 
agents with whom the taxpayer had entered into commission agn!e-
ments. The manufacturer's agents operated out of their own places of 
business outside of the Commonwealth and typically represented as 
many as ten other corporations in addition to the taxpayer. The tax-
payer exercised no control or authority over the day-to-day activities 
of these agents and they dealt with the taxpayer largely by correspon-
dence. Except in certain poor-risk situations, the agents had authority 
to conclude contracts without advance approval from the taxpayer. 5 
Based on this evidence, the Board held for the taxpayer. 6 The 
Board concluded that the agents were neither "situated at" nor "sent 
out from" the taxpayer's Massachusetts office. 7 Moreover, although it 
admitted that the agents were connected with the taxpayer's Mass-
achusetts office, the Board held that they were not "chiefly" con-
nected with that office "in the sense contemplated within the taxing 
statute."8 The Board held that the agents, as independent contractors 
and not employees of the taxpayer, "were chiefly connected with their 
own individual offices outside this state from which offices they oper-
ated in the sale of products for many corporations."9 
§ 11.28. Classification as Business Corporation or Manufacturing 
Corporation. In First Data Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 1 the 
Appellate Tax Board held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an 
appeal from the failure of the State Tax Commission to grant the 
3 (Emphasis added). The language of G.L. c. 63, § 38(£), was amended by Acts of 
1970, c. 562, and Acts of 1972, c. 748, § I, to read as follows: 
Sales of tangible personal property are in this commonwealth if: ... the corpora-
tion is not taxable in the state of the purchaser and the property was not sold by an 
agent or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out from premises for 
the transaction of business owned or rented by the corporation outside this 
commonwealth .... (Emphasis added). 
4 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MAss. '1200-41I, at I 0,329. 
5 !d. at I 0,328. 
6 !d. at I 0,330. 
7 !d. at I0,329. 
8 !d. 
9 !d. 
§Il.28. 1 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. f200-42I,i!t I0,339 (1975). 
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taxpayer's application on Form 355M for classification as a manufac-
turing corporation. 2 The Board reasoned that under the governing 
statute, section 2 of chapter 58 of the General Laws, a taxpayer must 
be "aggrieved" by a classification made by the Commissioner of Cor-
porations and Taxation (the "Commissioner") in order to have stand-
ing to file an application with the State Tax Commission on Form 
355M. Since the Commissioner had not yet made any classification, 
the Board held that the Form 355M filed by the taxpayer was 
premature.3 
The Board's decision, which seems sound 1 sheds some welcome 
light on one of the most murky areas of Massachusetts tax practice. It 
can be vitally important to a taxpayer to be classified as a manufactur-
ing, rather than as a business, corporation. Business corporations are 
subject to local tax on their machinery and equipment; manufacturing 
corporations .are not. 4 Moreover, only manufacturing corporations are 
eligible for the investment credit allowed under section 31A of chap-
ter 63 of the General Laws. Despite the importance of what is at stake, 
however, the procedures to be followed in securing classification as a 
manufacturing corporation are generally not well understood. 5 
Section 2 of chapter 58 of the General Laws requires the Commis-
sioner to send to each board of assessors, on or before April first of 
each year, a list of all corporations taxable in the Commonwealth, in-
dicating which have been classified as manufacturing corporations and 
which as business corporations. 6 The statute then goes on to provide 
that: 
2 I d. at 10,340. 
3 I d. 
4 See G.L. c. 59, § 5, d. 16th. 
5 In theory, the classification process is an annual event. As a practical matter, how-
ever, this is not the way the system works. In practice, corporations are presumed to be 
business corporations and will be so classified in the annual list unless they take the ini-
tiative and convince the Department that they are entitled to classification as a manufac-
turing corporation. Once they do establish that they are entitled to manufacturing cor-
poration classification, however, the presumption shifts and they will ordinarily retain 
that classification absent some event that gives the Department occasion to reexamine 
the question. 
One of the events that apparently will cause the Department to reexamine a 
corporation's status is a merger to which the corporation is a party. It appears to be the 
practice of the Department to treat the surviving corporation in a corporate merger in 
the same fashion as a newly organized corporation. Thus, unless some action is taken, 
the surviving corporation is automatically classified as a business corporation in the next 
annual list. This may occur even if the merger is with a shell corporation and is only 
undertaken to change the state of incorporation of the taxpayer. Thus, corporations 
that enjoy manufacturing classification and that contemplate participation in a merger 
should probably file a Form 355Q immediately after the consummation of the merger 
and should check the next annual list prepared by the Commissioner to insure that they 
have retained their desired status. 
6 In recent years, the list has usually been sent out in mid-September or early Oc-
tober. 
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Any person aggrieved by any classification made by the commis-
sioner under any provision of chapters fifty-nine and sixty-three 
or by any action taken by the commissioner under this section 
may, on or before April thirtieth of said year on the thirtieth day 
after such list is sent out by the commissioner, whichever is later, 
file an application with the state tax commission ... stating 
therein the classification claimed. 
If the Commission denies or refuses to take action on such an applica-
tion, the taxpayer may, within certain specified time periods, appeal 
to the Appellate Tax Board/ and from the Board to the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 8 
Much of the confusion regarding the proper procedure to be fol-
lowed in securing classification as a manufacturing corporation stems 
from failure to appreciate the different functions served by the two 
forms in current use: Form 355Q and Form 355M. Form 355Q, enti-
tled "Statement Relating to Manufacturing Activities," is the form that 
is filed with the Commissioner (not the State Tax Commission) in the 
first instance, in order to request classification as a manufacturing 
corporation. Form 355M, entitled "Application for Classification of a 
Corporation," on the other hand, is the form filed with the State Tax 
Commission pursuant to section 2 of chapter 58 of the General Laws, 
by corporations "aggrieved" by a classification made by the Commis-
sioner. It is the denial by the State Tax Commission of the application 
on Form 355M that is appealable to the Appellate Tax Board, not the 
denial by the Commissioner of the application on Form 355Q.9 The 
Board's decision in First Data Corporation makes it clear that the Form 
355M is not properly filed with the State Tax Commission until the 
taxpayer is "aggrieved" by a classification made by the Commissioner. 10 
The Board's decision in First Data Corporation does leave one point 
unclear. Assume that a Form 355Q is filed with the Commissioner re-
questing classification as a manufacturing corporation and that it is 
denied prior to the time when the list for the year is sent out to the 
local assessors. Must the taxpayer wait for the list to be sent out, or 
may he file Form 355M with the State Tax Commission on the basis 
of the Commissioner's notice that the application on Form 355Q has 
been denied? Until this point is clarified, the safest course of action 
would probably be to wait for the publication of the list. 
§ 11.29. Estimated Tax Payments. Effective for taxable years 
commencing after December 31, 1975, corporations subject to the 
Massachusetts business corporation excise tax will be required to make 
7 G.L. c. 58, § 2. 
B G.L. c. 58A, § 13. 
9 See G.L. c. 58, § 2. 
10 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., MASS. 11200-421, at 10,340. 
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quarterly, rather than semiannual, estimated tax payments. Section 4 
of chapter 63B of the General Laws formerly required such corpora-
tions to pay their estimated tax in two equal installments, one due by 
the 15th day of the sixth month of the taxable year and the other by 
the 15th day of the twelfth month of the taxable year. As amended by 
section 2 of chapter 427 of the Acts of 1975, the provision requires 
the estimated tax to be paid in four equal installments, the first due 
by the 15th day of the third month of the taxable year, the second by 
the 15th day of the sixth month, the third by the 15th day of the 
ninth month, and the last by the 15th day of the twelfth month. 1 
E. INHERITANCE TAXES 
§ 11.30. Life Estates with Power to Invade Principal. In Angevine 
v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected the Massachusetts Inheritance Tax Bureau's position2 that a 
gift of a life estate coupled with an unrestricted power to invade and 
consume principal should be treated as a gift of the complete interest 
in the property for inheritance tax purposes.3 
The case involved a testator who died in 1970, leaving a substantial 
amount of property to a maximum marital deduction trust ("marital 
trust") established under an inter vivos indenture. The terms of the 
marital trust provided that the net income was to be paid to the 
decedent's wife during her lifetime and that, in addition, she was to 
be paid all, or any portion, of the principal upon her written request. 4 
Because of the wife's unrestricted power to invade principal, the 
Massachusetts Inheritance Tax Bureau took the position that her in-
terest in the trust was the equivalent of outright ownership. 5 Accord-
ingly, it assessed a present interest tax based on the total value of all 
property transferred to the trust rather than on the actuarial value of 
the wife's life interest. 6 
§ 11.29. 1 Subsequent to the close of the Survey year, G.L. c. 63B, § 4(a), was further 
amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, §54, so as to require 30 percent of the estimated tax 
to be paid with the first installment, 25 percent with the second and third installments 
and the remaining 20 percent with the final installment. Under Acts of 1975, c. 684, 
§ 97, the amendment took.effect on January 1, 1976. 
§11.30. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1669,329 N.E.2d 124. 
2 The Bureau's position with respect to life estates with power to invade principal was 
developed internally in early 1972 and made public in the late summer of 1973. The 
Bureau attempted to apply its new policy only to estates of decedents dying after 
.January 1, 1970 where the present interest tax was certified after April 1, 1971. Letter 
from Thomas B. McDavitt, Chief, Inheritance Tax Bureau, to "All Interested Persons," 
September 25, 1973, a copy of which is on file at the offices of the Boston College In-
dustrial and Commerical Law Review, Boston College Law School, Newton Centre, 
Massachusetts. 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1670, 329 N.E.2d at 125. 
4 /d. at 1670-71, 329 N.E.2d at 125-26. 
• See id. at 1669-70, 329 N.E.2d at 125. 
6 See id. at 1671, 329 N.E.2d at 126. 
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Noting that the assessment would have the effect of imposing two 
taxes in place of one without any clear !egislative mandate, the Court 
held the assessment improper. 7 The Court observed that, under chap-
ter 65 of the General Laws, remainder interests in trusts are not tax-
able until they come into "possession or enjoyment."8 The Court held 
that the wife, despite her power to invade principal, would not come 
into possession or enjoyment of the principal of the trust until she ac-
tually exercised the power. 9 
§11.31. Widow's Benefits. Shaughnessy v. Commissioner of Corpora-
tions & Taxation 1 was a decision of the Appeals Court on a petition for 
abatement of an inheritance tax under section 27 of chapter 65 of the 
General Laws. 2 The case was reserved and reported by the probate 
court. The decedent at the time of his death in 1968 was president 
and treasurer of Shaughnessy & Ahern Company (the "Company"). 
Subsequently, the stockholders and directors of the Company held a 
special meeting and voted to pay his widow $32,500 in equal weekly 
installments over two years. The Company had never before made 
payments of this sort to the estate or relatives of a deceased officer or 
employee, and it was under no contractual or other obligation to the 
decedent to do so. 3 The executors of the Shaughnessy estate argued 
that the inheritance tax was not applicable since the widow's benefit in 
this case was not "property ... pass[ing] by will, or by laws regulating 
intestate succession, or by deed, grant or gift"4 within the meaning of 
chapter 65 of the General Laws. The court held that the decedent 
had no property interest in the payments and that the Commissioner's 
assessment of an inheritance tax with respect to them was improper. 
The court agreed that the payments were not property transferred by 
the decedent, but "a gratuity conferred upon the widow by an inde-
pendent third party. " 5 Accordingly, the court held that the 
7 !d. at 1675, 329 N.E.2d at 127. Under prior Bureau policy, the value of the re-
mainder interest in the marital trust would have been taxed only once, on the death of 
the wife, unless the power to invade was exercised. Under the new policy, it would have 
been taxable twice, once on the death of the husband and again on the death of the 
wife, even though the power to invade was not exercised. See id. at 1672, 329 N.E.2d at 
126. 
8 !d. at 1669, 329 N.E.2d at 125. 
9 /d. at 1675, 329 N.E.2d at 127. The importance of the Angevine case was diminished 
somewhat by the enactment, subsequent to the close of the Survey year, of the new 
Massachusetts Estate Tax, replacing the old inheritance tax in the case of all persons 
dying on or after January I, 1976. Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 74, adding G.L. c. 65C. The 
new Massachusetts Estate Tax, which is closely patterned after the Federal Estate Tax, 
will in most cases eliminate the need to distinguish present and future interests for 
death tax purposes. 
§11.31. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 672, 326 N.E.2d 912. 
2 G.L. c. 65, § 27, permits executors and administrators, inter alia, to petition the pro-
bate court for the abatement of an allegedly erroneously assessed inheritance tax. 
3 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 674, 326 N.E.2d at 913. 
4 G.L. c. 65, § I. 
5 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 674, 326 N.E.2d at 913. 
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Commissioner's assessment of the inheritance tax was improper. 6 
F. MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENTS 
§11.32. New Administrative Provisions. Chapter 462 of the Acts 
of 197 5 amended section 34 of chapter 58 of the General Laws so as 
to increase the penalty for tendering a bad check in payment of a tax 
liability. The penalty was formerly 1 percent of the amount of the 
check except that if the check was for less than $500, the penalty was 
$5 or the amount of the check, whichever was less. 1 Effective with re-
spect to payments made on or after January 1, 1976, the penalty will 
be 2 percent of the amount of the check except that if the check is for 
less than $500, the penalty will be $10 or the amount of the check, 
whichever is less.2 In addition, chapter 462 provides that the in-
creased penalties are "in addition to any other penalties provided by 
law."3 
Chapter 438 of the Acts of 197 5 added section 51 to chapter 58 of 
the General Laws, introducing for the first time a long overdue 
timely-mailing-timely-payment rule similar to the one under the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 19544 Section 51 provides that if a tax pay-
ment is due on or before a specific date and such payment is deliv-
ered by United States mail after such date, the date of the United 
States postmark stamped on the envelope will be deemed the date of 
payment, but only if the payment was mailed in the United States in a 
properly addressed envelope, first class postage prepaid, and the 
postmark falls on or before the due date of the tax. In the case of 
payments under section 5 of chapter 62B, chapters 64A-64I, and 
chapter 138 of the General Laws, the new timely-mailing-timely-
payment rule will not apply unless the date of mailing falls on or be-
fore the second day before the due date of the payment.s 
§ 11.33. Appellate Tax Board: Practice Procedure. Under the 
Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, 1 decisions of most state 
6 /d. See also Narva v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 358 Mass. 648, 266 
N.E.2d 638 (1971); National Shawmut Bank v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 
354 Mass. 350, 237 N.E.2d 290 (1968). 
§11.32. 1 Acts of 1968, c. 154, § l. 
2 Acts of 197 5, c. 462. 
3 /d. 
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7502. 
5 Acts of 1975, c. 438. Unlike its federal counterpart, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 7502(c), the new G.L. c. 58, §51, does not provide that, in the case of registered or 
certified mail, the date of registration or the date of the post office receipt will be 
deemed the date of postmark. This is an important omission since, absent such a provi-
sion, a taxpayer cannot protect himself against the risk that the payment letter will not 
be postmarked on the day it is deposited in the mails. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-l(c). 
§11.33. 1 G.L. c. 30A, §§ l-17. 
53
Hines: Chapter 11: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
§ 11.33 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 255 
agencies can be set aside by the courts if "[u]nsupported by substantial 
evidence."2 As a result of a 1968 amendment, however, the state Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act does not apply to the Appellate Tax 
Board.3 Under section 13 of chapter 58A of the General Laws, deci-
sions of the Appellate Tax Board are "final as to findings of fact." 
Appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court are permitted, but only "as to 
matters of law."4 Thus, a finding of the Board can be challenged only 
on the grounds that, as a matter of law, it was not warranted by the 
evidence before the Board. Moreover, as illustrated by several deci-
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year, even this 
limited right to challenge the findings of the Board will be lost unless 
certain procedural steps are taken. 
In Martin v. State Tax Commission, 5 the taxpayer appealed from a de-
cision of the Appellate Tax Board, claiming that the evidence be-
fore the Board required a judgment in his favor. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that the taxpayer was foreclosed from making this ar-
gument on appeal because he had failed to request that the Board 
make findings of fact and a report thereon. 6 The Court noted that, 
under section 13, if no party requests such findings and report, "all 
parties shall be deemed to have waived all rights of appeal to the su-
preme judicial court upon questions as to the admission or exclusion 
of evidence, or as to whether a finding was warranted by the 
evidence."7 
In Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, 8 plaintiffs claimed that the town 
assessors had assessed all property in the town at less than its fair 
value and "in a manner discriminating against the taxpayers."9 The 
Appellate Tax Board held for the assessors and the taxpayers ap-
pealed, asserting that the Board had erred in deciding that the tax-
payers had not proved their case. 10 The Supreme Judicial Court af-
firmed, holding that it could not consider whether, as a matter of law, 
the evidence before the Board warranted its findings because no 
stenographic report of the proceedings before the Board was either 
requested or madeY The Court noted that section 10 of chapter 58A 
of the General Laws provides that if no party requests that the pro-
ceedings before the Board be reported, all parties are "deemed to 
2 /d. § 14(8)(e). 
3 Acts of 1968, c. 120, amending G.L. c. 30A, § 1. 
4 G.L. c. 58A, § 13, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 5. Under Acts of 1973, c. 
1114, § 5, the new Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure are applicable to ap-
peals from the Appellate Tax Board. 
5 1975 Mass:Adv. Sh. 239, 322 N.E.2d 419 (rescript opinion). 
6 Id. at 239, 322 N.E.2d at 420. 
7 /d., quoting G.L. c. 58A, § 13. Accord, Chayet v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1590, 328 N.E.2d 521. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1684, 329 N.E.2d 117. 
9 /d. at 1685, 329 N.E.2d at 119. 
10 See id. 
11 !d. at 1689, 329 N.E.2d at 120. 
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have waived all rights of appeal to the supreme judicial court upon 
questions as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or as to 
whether a finding was warranted by the evidence". 12 
12 /d., citing G.L. c. 58A, § 10. 
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